Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
experts. All normal water experts have been taken by the international organizations” 292 (NGO
representative, Dushanbe, 08/25/2004).
To give an example: One water expert, who worked for the state water administration on oblast
level for 23 years, left it to become a WUA specialist at an international NGO. He is very
committed to his work in supporting the establishment of three WUAs. One must ask whether
he could not have had a greater impact on the institutional reform, if he had received the same
training but had stayed in the state administration.
This may result in a sense of exclusion from the political processes and resource flows by
meso and local level 'hydrocrats'. Consequently, the state agencies that should implement the
reform lack not only the capacities but also the ownership for real commitment to the reform
processes. Water institutional reform is expected to be a donors' issue. This role of donors is
not only rooted in donors' interests, but it also reflects the interests of some state actors: With
donors and international NGOs taking over tasks like the provision of water from the state,
there is a tendency to rely on donor and NGO engagement and thus “outsource” certain state
activities and responsibilities.
Clearly, there are several institutional linkages through which the different water institu
tional elements influence each other. Concerning WUA reform, policies are implemented
without the necessary legal framework, resulting in an insecure position of the newly estab
lished water rules. The strongest discrepancy is between water policy and law on the one side
and water administration on the other side. This leads to serious contradictions that have an
enormous negative impact on the overall reform process.
7.5
Summary
In its first part, this chapter described the major water institutional reforms conducted in Taji
kistan. The country renewed its 1994 Water Code in 2000. One year later, a water policy strate
gy was issued, which was replaced by a new one in 2006. Concerning concrete reform meas
ures, ISFs were introduced in 1996 and the transfer of irrigation management to water user
associations (WUAs) began in 1999.
Although several reforms have been decided on and a legal framework and policy strate
gies were also developed, the reform objectives have not been met so far. The Water Code still
lacks important implementation mechanisms and is often not applied due to the lacking know
ledge and will to apply it. The ISF are also not widely implemented. The basic precondition for
effective implementation is communication of the political decisions to those who are ex
pected to implement them. This is already the first obstacle to the implementation of water
institutional reform in Tajikistan. In fact, institutional and policy innovations on the local level
are made by projects such as those of WB, ADB, UNDP, USAID, SDC and of international
NGOs and not by the water agencies. This led to a multitude of un coordinated projects. It is a
result of the history of foreign engagement in Tajikistan, which has until recently been concen
trated on local projects. The new Water Sector Development Strategy can provide a sound
basis: It again underlines the commitment to IWRM, basin management, and WUA establish
ment. But for its realization it needs to be streamlined in the Water Code, other legal acts,
policies and projects. Given the experience in policy processes so far, this seems rather unrea
listic.
292 „ , (…). . -
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