Introduction - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 2

counted for when assessing water usage. On the other hand, it points to the necessity of good
governance rule of law, stakeholder participation, transparency, accountability, etc. in the
water sector. “Good water governance” quickly became a popular buzzword at conferences
and in the discourse of international donor agencies.
The evolving strategy to address the water crisis is no longer to build more dams (i.e. en
hance supply) or to make water more expensive (i.e. reduce demand). Instead, it calls for a
reform of the institutions the rules and structures that regulate water distribution and usage.
This view is apparent in the following quotation that was cited in a report of the Asian Devel
opment Bank (ADB): “Do not fix the pipes, fix the institutions that fix the pipes” (WSP 2004:
32). At first sight, this appears to be an illustrative example that institutions are considered
relevant to the issue of water governance. By closer inspection, however, it reveals the still
existing technocratic approach: it indicates that one can 'fix' institutions just as one can fix a
pipe. However, institutional reform is always a political process with conflicting interests at
stake. Additionally, informal institutions cannot be changed 'fixed' by government deci
sion. Hence, if one presumes they have an input on water governance, it requires the rethink
ing of reform policies and adequate strategies.
Good water governance may be a catchphrase at conferences and on the policy agendas
of donor organizations. But how can it be put into practice, especially in states that are not
characterized by good governance and democratic structures in general? Many of the develop
ing countries that implement water institutional reforms can be subsumed under the category
of neopatrimonial regimes: while democratic institutions exist formally, they co exist with
patrimonial informal institutions such as clientelism, corruption, and personalistic leadership.
These have the potential to undermine the formal democratic ones. Can water institutional
reforms (WIR) be effective (i.e., can they achieve good water governance) in such a neopatri
monial institutional context?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to scrutinize the political process, i.e. the
politics of these reforms. This process can be analytically divided into policy formulation and
policy implementation. The first involves the question of whose ideas and values are
represented in policy decisions. The second refers to who is in charge of the implementation of
these decisions and in which way he or she influences it. Who are the relevant actors that force
or prevent decisions for reform? Who is responsible for implementing these policy decisions?
Who actually implements and who prevents them? And how are the actors and their behavior
influenced by the institutional context, i.e. the neopatrimonial regime? By identifying the fac
tors through which this context has an impact on the politics of WIR, explanations for the
success and failure of reforms can be found and lessons can be drawn for the design of effec
tive reform strategies.
As the concept of good water governance and the focus on WIR only emerged in the first
few years of the 21 st century, it is obvious that research on the feasibility of these approaches is
still at the outset. There is a need for detailed case studies in order to understand the complexi
ty of water governance, as well as for systematic comparisons in order to draw inferences and
bounded generalizations that can inform theory building as well as future policy programs.
Although many case studies on certain aspects of WIR have been conducted, such as on water
user associations (WUAs), on irrigation reform, on participatory management, and on water
pricing, seldom does anyone provide a systematic and comprehensive comparative perspective
(with the exception of the works of Saleth and Dinar). This study aims to make a contribution
to the emerging scholarship on water governance and water institutional reform as well as
enrich it with an explicit political science perspective. It intends to show the complexity of