Water Institutional Reforms in Tajikistan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 160

before and after the establishment. These training activities often also include jamoat , khukumat
and RaiVodKhoz representatives and address issues like the setting up of a water use plan, water
law, and conflict resolution, among others. 283 The impact of those activities is limited, though.
This is rooted on the one hand in the tight time frames of projects and an often merely in
strumental understanding of participation. In general, a majority of the village population is
marginalized in local decision making processes. Little knowledge and awareness of WUAs is
thus not a special feature of this organization but rather is typical for all local level organiza
tions.
The dilemma is that donors can establish democratic mechanisms (like WUA council
elections) but these can only serve as a frame for democracy that has to be filled by the local
actors. The non democratic environment and the high degree of patronage present a difficult
environment for the implementation and support of projects aimed at strengthening self
governance and empowerment. People expect the rais to take care of them and are not used to
become pro active themselves. This is also reflected in the decision of the CFPS to tolerate the
unification of the positions of WUA chair and director in one person, as is the case in many
WUAs. While this contradicts the separation of executive and legislative powers inside the
WUA, it is accepted with the justification that it reflectd the expectations of local farmers to
have an authoritative leader and hence is a necessary concession to the institutional conditions
(Rakhmatilloev et al. 2003: 102f).
Despite all of these institutions that are formally or informally legitimized to organize vil
lage life, the main local organization remains the DF as a subsequent organization of the kol
khoz . In the case study it became evident how the role of the patron is fulfilled by the director
of the dekhkan Farm, who was the brigadier of the kolkhoz before. He was often referred to as
rais of the village. People expect the DF to be in charge of the village's well being. This percep
tion is a result and heritage of the kolkhoz (and the Soviet state in general), which provided
them with everything they needed for a living. Today, the center for resource distribution (the
patron of the patron in this clientelistic system) is no longer the party committee in Dushanbe
but the government, private structures (like the cotton investors), and international donor
organizations. The agency for the distribution of these resources is no longer the FSK but
instead the DF as well as newly established community based organizations. People were ac
customed to the Soviet system that took care of everything, and then they witnessed interna
tional humanitarian aid taking on this role. The involvement of intermediaries, which is neces
sary to comply with the tight timeframes and goal orientation of development projects, streng
thens existing leaders. They not only have access to resources, but also receive further training
and knowledge which can even intensify inequality. This new role of the patron could be de
fined as “local development broker”, a category introduced in development sociology to de
scribe the role of intermediaries between the local population (the target group) and develop
ment agencies (Bierschenk et al. 2002). In this way, donors become part of the patronage sys
tem.
As shown, local governance institutions in particular have an impact on WUA reform. In
theory, the WUA is meant to be based on the participation of all water users and is supposed
to serve as a self governing organization, independent from the official administrative struc
tures. In practice however, it mirrors the existing power structures in the village. WUA direc
tors and councils feel more accountable to the donor organization that promoted it than to its
members, i.e., the people who elected them. This certainly is also connected to the fact that
283 Author's interview with a local representative of an INGO, Khudjand, 10/03/2005.