Water Institutional Reforms in Tajikistan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 155

The development of policy documents seems to proceed rather quickly and without discussion
on conflicting points. Policy fragmentation was not considered a problem by the experts inter
viewed. This may be related to the strong MinVodKhoz but also to the less participatory style of
decision making, where different interests cannot be formulated and hence do not cause prob
lems. 273 However, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan, budget allocations to ministries and agencies in
Tajikistan depend on the competencies and functions they perform. This insecurity might be
enforced by the occasionally subjective character of budget allocations. Sometimes, the decided
budget is not allotted in the end (GoT 2002: 19; ADB 2000). This means that an agency cannot
even be sure to receive the funds attached to its responsibilities. “As a result, public bodies
focus on extending their authority and increasing budget financing, rather than on policy mak
ing and supervising implementation” (GoT 2002: 19).
Despite the political instability, two versions of the Water Code (1994 and 2000) and the
policy strategy (2001 and 2006) were developed and approved. This however must not be
misinterpreted as representing a consensus on main policy issues, but rather is yet another
indication of the lack of open debate not only with the public, but also among experts. As a
result, there is obviously no commitment to implement the decisions: The approved policy
documents lack proper sub normative acts and implementation mechanisms.
The Parliament is not a relevant actor in the water decision making process and is not
even mentioned in the 2000 Water Code as having a function. There are no formal mechan
isms for the interests of the water users to be recognized in political decisions. The civil society
capacities to accompany the processes are limited; the number of advocacy oriented NGOs
and academic institutions is insignificant.
The prominent commitment to water as a policy priority as reflected in the activities for
the UN Year of Freshwater and the subsequent decade does not reflect actual problems
perceived by the water users nor is it followed by any concerted action to address at least the
disastrous situation in the water and sanitation sector. It seems that these activities are re
stricted to a symbolic level without concrete actions to follow. The Tajik government, which is
often only associated with civil war, drug trafficking, and an authoritarian regime, uses water to
gain a good international reputation. Not surprisingly, a slightly critical exhibition developed by
a local project for the 2003 Dushanbe Freshwater Conference about water use in Tajikistan
was banned from being displayed in the official conference building.
Donors have a noteworthy impact on the decision making process. The WSDS and the
Law on WUAs were drafted with donor involvement. The Law on WUAs reflects the need for
donors to have a legal foundation for the WUAs, which they established. Hence, the decision
making process is characterized by presidential dominance and by a lack of capacities of and
possibilities for the participation of stakeholders. It follows the interests of the President and
the donors and not the problem perception of the water users.

7.4.2

The Impact of the Institutional Conditions of the Agricultural Sector on WIR

The reform processes in the agricultural sector have repeatedly been mentioned as the main
reason for the development of the new water code (see chapter 7.3.2) as well as the establish
ment of WUAs: “It is a mandatory process: if there are private dekhkan farms, they have to

273 As was shown, conflicts of interests do exist, although they are hardly openly communicated.