Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 131

There are many qualified experts with years of relevant experience. But some experts have
been excluded because they did not have the right connections while others fill positions with
out having the right qualification. This is why efforts to reform the water administration not
only structurally but also with regard to its internal rules are met by resistance.

6.5 Summary

The structure of water governance in Kyrgyzstan is characterized by a strong administrative
fragmentation that results in incoherent policies and competiting interests and strategies of the
involved actors. Besides the DepVodKhoz , the most important ones are the Presidential appara
tus (especially the MISI) and donor agencies (especially the World Bank, ADB, and USAID),
but they also include several other state agencies and the IWP&HP.
This first half of the chapter described in detail the water institutional reforms conducted
in Kyrgyzstan between 1991 and 2005 and traced the processes of decision making and im
plementation. It showed that the political elite did not succeed in deciding on a policy in the
strict sense of the word. Only at the end of the research period was a Water Code approved
which is, however, contested in many parts of the expert community. Despite the lack of a
policy strategy, several reform programs are being conducted: administrative reorganization,
introduction of the ISF, and the establishment of Water User Associations. While all three
might be assessed as successful when one only looks at formal aspects, closer inspections have
revealed that none of them met its objectives.
The politics of these water institutional reforms is influenced by the neopatrimonial re
gime. The decision making institutions are relatively open to different actors from state agen
cies, civil society and scholars, as well as donor organizations. However, agenda setting and
leadership in policy formulation are dominated by the president. Under these circumstances,
other actors are restricted to veto playing, foster self interest, or switch to symbolic politics.
The institutional constraints of the agricultural sector seriously limit the feasibility of introduc
ing ISF. Apart from its economic features, the continuing dominance of the FSK structures
also hinders a functioning market economy which good water governance ideals implicitly
presuppose. Finally, water management is closely nested in the institutions of local governance.
WUAs are incorporated in their logic of patronage, and ISF are undermined as local institu
tions provide alternative and more reliable rules for water access. Concerning water
institutional linkages, the meso level of the water administration is characterized by internal
rules opposite those embodied in the new water institutions: hierarchy, patronage, and no
accountability to the target group. These rules are still applied and shape assumptions how new
organizations like the WUAs should function; they are subordinated to this logic. Water law
reform took considerably longer than reform of water policy leading to gaps and contradic
tions that hinder the functioning of the new rules.
Donors are involved in this process as actors as well as rule setters toward which national
actors orient themselves. Their role is also a result of the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, not
only due to the open regime inviting donor involvement but also due to the capacities of so
cietal actors to articulate and participate in the political process. In organizing conferences and
adopting strategies that are nice to read but have no concrete consequences for existing power
structures, the interests of the government, experts, and donors coincide.