Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 130

For the RaiVodKhozes , WUAs facilitate their work after the dissolution of the FSK, as WUAs
ended the “administrative nightmare” (DFID 2003:6 6) of making individual contracts and
pursuing individual fee collection with every single farmer. The RaiVodKhoz does not feel ac
countable toward WUAs; this is visible in the insecurity of water delivery. The WUAs, for their
part, lack the awareness to demand this accountability apart from the fact that they are in
many cases indebted to the RaiVodKhoz and therefore have an unfavorable position.
Another aspect that is important to RaiVodKhoz is that WUAs provide a possibility to
gain access to loans and grants to rehabilitate the irrigation infrastructure. The existence of a
WUA is a precondition for an application for loans or subsidies from the WB and the ADB
(and other donors). Therefore, the establishment of a WUA is often the only way of complet
ing necessary rehabilitation work. The director of a RaiVodKhoz in Issyk Kul oblast described it
very clearly: “The state is allocating fewer resources to the RaiVodKhoz . That is why we need
WUAs, because they will receive money from donors. (...) There is only one way: WUA. All
donors work via WUAs” (Director of a RaiVodKhoz , Issyk Kul oblast , 09/20/2004). This atti
tude of the meso level is understandable, as the RaiVodKhozes were fiven a considerable num
ber of new tasks including the collection of ISFs and dealing with WUAs (which are much in
need of support) while simultaneously allotted means were reduced and training not pro
vided. Therefore, in many of the World Bank project raions, WUA support departments were
set up at the RaiVodKhozes . In the long term, these should be part of the water bureaucracy.
This is a useful and necessary component of the project to enable the water administration to
cope with the new challenges.
The patrimonial organizational culture of the water administration also has another intra
institutional effect that downsizes the effectiveness of capacity building programs conducted
by various donors. Many of the Soviet educated experts possess sound technical knowledge
but not the competencies needed for new policies, such as to empower and train WUAs. The
impact of training activities is limited, however, as the trained staff members have not yet been
able to apply and disseminate their new knowledge: Senior staff did not accept this new know
ledge and felt threatened by the new competencies of the younger colleagues. The mentality of
the 'hydrocrats' in the state bureaucracy is still shaped by the Soviet style of management that
did its best to prevent change and initiative on one's own (ADB 2000a: 2f ; ISRI, Socinform
buro, FES 2004: 38f). Another obstacle to capacity building is that staffing is not always
oriented toward one's qualification but rather toward patronage principles or bribes: “(...)
people are not appointed according to the principle of how well they know the issue or not.
Whoever gives more becomes the head and runs everything. Because of this principle of man
agement, the reforms in the water sector got stuck” 192 (University professor, Bishkek,
10/01/2003).
In the case of the DepVodKhoz as well, there are rumors that the director at time of research
bought his position. 193 Yet those staffing decisions do not only affect the leading positions and
also do not stop at the WUA support departments funded by the World Bank. Interviewed
staff members complained that they had to work with unqualified, inexperienced, and unmoti
vated collegues hired only due to their relations to persons in higher positions. 194 This is cer
tainly not to say that all people in the water administration attained their positions like this.
192 „... , ,
, , - ,
.“
193 Author's interview with university professor, Bishkek, 10/01/2003.
194 Personal communication with the director of a WUA support department.