Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
6.4.3
The Impact of Local Governance Institutions on WIR
Similar to agriculture, local governance saw formal reforms introducing democratic mechan
isms while clientelistic informal institutions persist as well. Formally, the
aiyl okmotu
has been
established as a local government structure. It is amended by several informal institutions. The
sud aksakolov
has meanwhile been formalized, but it functions differently in each village. Also,
the network of the powerful actors of the FSK (former director, brigadier, etc.) still plays a
role. This variable affects those aspects of WIR that must be implemented on the local level
and that change existing local water governance rules, namely the transfer of irrigation man
agement to WUAs and the payment of ISF.
Three main impacts will be described: First, WUAs are not active as independent organi
zations but instead are co opted by local governance structures. Second, neopatrimonial fea
tures are transferred into the WUA and become principles of water governance as well. Third,
new water institutions can come into conflict with other local rule sets and be undermined by
them.
Yet before we describe these, it should be mentioned that there are positive interactions
as well: For regular maintenance, WUAs generally apply
hashars
(see chapter 5.3). Many repor
tedlyo gather their members once or twice a year for voluntary cleaning work in the channel.
Also, where there are no WUAs,
hashars
are organized for the irrigation set, e.g. by the FSK.
Sometimes
hashars
are also part of loan programs, meaning when a WUA gets a loan or grant
for materials and then the community members do the work.
Hashars
are also organized by
WUAs for the cleaning of off farm channels for the
Raivodkhoz
as a payment in kind for water
delivery (see chapter 6.3.4 above). With the revitalization of this well known and accepted rule
of common work at the village level, it is possible to maintain the channels without vast finan
cial means. This way, it may even be possible to create a sense of ownership for the facilities. It
also has its limitations, however: first,
hashars
are only suitable for small canals. Their use for
cleaning work in larger channels can only be a temporary measure but does not offer a long
term perspective. Second, as its basic principle is voluntariness, it enters into difficulties if it is
included as mandatory in loan programs.
Co optation by the Local Government
At the beginning of the WUA reform, there were reports of opposing local administrative
bodies. Very soon, however, they seem to have discovered the advantages of WUAs for them
selves and therefore a motivation to actively support their establishment. Several cases were
encountered in field research in which the
aiyl okmotu
itself initiated the WUA. This is unders
tandable, as a WUA facilitates work of
aiyl okmotu
and at least to date does not oppose it.
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WUAs do not work as independent, empowered farmer organizations, but rather as a kind of
public service provider closely linked to the
aiyl okmotu
. This process mirrors the general atti
tude towards non governmental organizations on village level: In the beginning, they were
feared by the authorities, as NGOs with access to donor grants possess financial means that
the
aiyl okmotu
does not have. However, local authorities learned to co opt NGOs instead of
seeing them as a rival. In general,
aiyl okmotu
seem after initial hesitation to welcome NGOs
as they can use them as a means to gain access to donors. This process is similar with WUAs.
The WUA is a way to gain access to loans and is therefore attractive to the
aiyl okmotu
and the
188
The fact that WUAs do not present any type of challenge to the
aiyl okmotu
is confirmed by the fact that many
aiyl
okmotu
in the case study
raion
did not pay their ISF (for the 25% of FSK land that remained under government
ownership) without the WUAs effectively demanding the money from them.
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