Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 120

allocated enough money, they would agree, because they would not need their competencies so
urgently” (Independent water expert, Bishkek, 09/28/2004).
This means that one result of the constellation in the decision making arena is that frag
mented responsibilities and shortages in funds lead to a dominance of self interest and frag
mented policies instead of joint decision making. Reform efforts to overcome these fizzle out.
This especially affects those reforms that aim to restructure administration. Despite efforts for
comprehensive approaches, international programs also tend to reflect the policy fragmenta
tion:
“There are at the moment several international programs, (...) the European Water Initiative, (...) Central Asian
Water Initiative, Regional Environmental Action Plan, Aral Sea Basin Program II I have just read out six
programs, and each of these is operationalized with another agency” (Representative of NGO, Bishkek,
09/12/2003). 178
Another result of the institutions of decision making is the dominance of issues of transboun
dary water governance over domestic water governance issues in political discourse. In the
public political debates on water, the conducted reforms and the widespread perceived prob
lems are underrepresented. Instead a strong focus on transboundary water exists, and the ac
tors sometimes tend to ideologized viewpoints. In a political discourse that does not really
influence decision making, symbolic gains play an important role. Here, the water issue prom
ises high symbolic value. I argue that this is the reason why the transboundary water issue is so
prominent in political discourse. It is a useful means in international politics as it generates
more (symbolic) gains there than in national politics. In the words of one interviewee: “Water
has two main components: it is economy, and water is, let's say, politics. Economy this is
energy production, this is irrigation. Politics this is to play with the neighboring states” (se
nior official of the MEChS , Bishkek, 09/17/2003). 179
The harsh perception of transboundary water issues resulted in the 2001 law on trans
boundary water issues. Besides ISF, it was the only reform decision, in which donors were not
involved and which was solely was based on national actors and where the Parliament played
an agenda setting role. The strategic value of water lies not only in the area of international
politics, it serves domestic purposes as well. In times of economic crisis and political reorgani
zation the search for 'external enemies' provides a good means of dealing with problems (see
Huskey 2002: 84f, ISRI, Socinformburo, FES 2004: 73). For the government and Parliament it
is more comfortable to blame problems on a lack of economic mechanisms in international
water relations than to enforce farmers' payments of adequate water fees, which would mean
risking the loss of their political base.
Here again, the policies of donors play a role: A second reason for the concentration of
the public discourse on international water issues can be seen in the incentives set by donors.
The involvement of donors also shapes the national discourse about water and consequently
the problem perception. One of the main areas of donor involvement in Central Asia has been
and still is water. In the 1990s, many scholars anticipated violent conflicts in the regions. Con
flicts about water distribution and use were seen as one of their most possible causes. Conse
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