Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 107

symbolic; it covers only approximately about 20% of the actual O&M costs. 154 The fees have
not been increased since then although a yearly review takes place in theory. Respective laws
have been submitted to Parliament in 2000, 2001, and 2002, but they were not accepted (John
son III, Stoutjesdijk, Djailobayev 2002: 4; Dzhaylobaev 2003: 70; Djailoobaev 2004: 74). The
opposition of the Parliament is a consequence of the farmers' interest as a main voter group.
“The ascertainment of the tariffs does not depend on economic factors, does not yield the
needed expenditures, but all too often the height of the tariffs is defined by political condi
tions” (Dzhajlobaev 2003: 70, translation JS). The determination of the height of ISF hence “is
a political decision rather than an economic one” (Johnson III, Stoutjesdijk, Djailobaev 2002:
4). In the 2005 Water Code, the authority to determine the height of the ISF is transferred to
the government, while the Parliament has now the final say on the height of the state budget
allocations to the water sector. Additionally, the Parliament can establish a fee on the usage of
water as natural resource (§§ 40, 48, 83). It remains to be seen whether this will lead to an
increase in the amount of the ISF. While government experts stress that the ISF had to be
raised, they are also reluctant to say it in public. At a workshop for WUA representatives, one
government official even announced that ISF could decrease after WUA federations are
formed a completely unrealistic scenario. 155
Besides the reluctance to establish effective water fees, even implementation of the sym
bolic ISF, i.e. the collecting of the water fees from the farmers, is far from being realized. With
the establishment of WUAs thare was hope that collection rates increase as they are now in
charge of collecting the ISF from their members (see chap. 6.3.5 below). However, though
payment rates improved in recent years, they are still low throughout the country. There are no
exact data on ISF collection rates. Older World Bank data state a rate of 19% in 1995 and 80%
in 1997 (Thurman 2002: 8). However, other data are presented in Table 13. These data cover
only WUAs, where one can assume that the rate is higher than in those places where WUAs do
not yet exist. In areas without WUAs, the collection rate is even less, as the RaiVodKhozes do
not have the staff capacities for individual collection from the farmers. But as the table shows,
even under suitable circumstances, only half of the ISF are collected. Additionally, a considera
ble part of ISF is paid in kind.
Table 13: Collection of ISF in WUAs in 2003

Oblast Average collection rate in WUAs

Jalal-Abad
Batken
Osh
Issyk-Kul
Naryn
Talas
Chuy

57%
62%
43%
42%
45%
61%
62%

Total 53%

Source: Alymbaeva 2004: 11.

153 For regions with “difficult natural conditions” the fees are lower.
154 Author's interview with a local consultant of an international donor organization, Bishkek, 09/29/2004. There are
different calculations and estimations as to how high they should be. Hassan et al (2004: 39) assume that the current
fees would have to be raised by 5 to 7 times. One expert estimated that the real O&M costs are about six USD per ha
of irrigated land (international consultant, Osh, 09/18/2004). There are efforts by the DepVodKhoz to increase the ISF
to at least 6-10 tyn per cubic meter.
155 Author's observation at a WUA workshop in Osh, 09/17/2004.