Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 100

law, as the old law was abolished at the time when the new Water Code was not yet provided
with the necessary bylaws to make it work. As turned out later, this interim period endured
longer than anticipated due to the political turmoil in March 2005 and the subsequent time of
instability. Only after the presidential elections in July 2005, did work begin again, and it was
only by the end of 2005 that eight normative acts to realize the Water Code had been pre
pared. 128 As far as structural reform is concerned, the steps to implement these will be de
scribed in chapter 6.3.3 on administrative reform.

6.3.2.2

Laws concerning Transboundary Waters

This study focuses on domestic water policy. Still, I will now insert a short chapter on foreign
water policy. This is important for the following reasons: First, water is rather perceived as an
issue of international relations than of domestic politics in Kyrgyzstan, so a comprehensive
understanding of water policy must cover these aspects as well. Second, all main rivers in Kyr
gyzstan are transboundary (Naryn, Talas, Chuy, Sary Dzhas) with Kyrgyzstan located up
stream, so all decisions on the economic usage of water resources always have implications on
downstream states and thus affect foreign relations. Third, a comparison of the decision mak
ing process in this sphere with domestic water policy allows for interesting insights and infe
rences.
An initial presidential decree on transboundary water issues “On the foundations of the
foreign policy in the area of usage of water resources of rivers that originate in Kyrgyzstan and
flow to the territories of bordering states” was issued in 1997 but did not have much impact
(Mamatkanov 2003: 100). Of much more importance is the 2001 “Law on International Use of
Water Objects, Water Resources and Water Management Facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic”.
This law defines water as a natural resource that possesses economic value. It should therefore
be treated according to economic principles; thus, payment for water should be introduced on
the international level. It reflects the position emerged that Kyrgyzstan should “sell” its water
resources like its neighbors sell their coal, gas, or oil resources. 129 According to this law, Kyr
gyzstan has ownership of all water resources originating on its territory. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan
claims the right to use as much water as it requires for its present and future needs, which
ultimately means that the legitimacy of the international agreements on regional water distribu
tion is put into question. The law is also a consequence of the discontentment about lacking
cost sharing mechanisms for the operation and maintenance of hydro technical facilities on
Kyrgyz territory that discharge irrigation water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (see ch. 5.4.3).
The law provoked harsh reactions by neighboring states. The President of Kazakhstan as
well as the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan severely criticized the law as being incompatible to
standards of international water law and refused to accept it (Shalpykova 2002, Usulbaliev
2002). 130 But the law is criticized not only by the neighboring countries but also in Kyrgyzstan.
It reflects an extreme position that is also widely contested within Kyrgyzstan but nevertheless

128 Author's interview with a senior official of the DepVodKhoz , Bishkek, 11/03/2005.
129 Author's interview with the director of the IWP&HP, Bishkek, 09/15/2003; with a NGO representative, Bishkek,
09/12/2003; with a senior official at the MISI, Bishkek, 09/16/2003.
130 Meanwhile, Kazakhstan acknowledged the legitimacy of compensation mechanisms and is involved in payment for
Chuy and Talas water facilities.