Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 91

State and Collective Farms, Local Government
Prior to their dissolution during land reform (see chapter 5.5.3), sovkhozes (state farms) and
kolkhozes (collective farms) owned the on farm irrigation systems (tertiary channels). They were
responsible for their operation and maintenance, which they had to finance from their own
resources. After land reform, this responsibility was transferred to the local government ( aiyl
okmotu ). It was supposed to cover the initial vacuum left with no organization responsible for
O&M of tertiary channels. In those places where WUAs have not yet been established, it is
formally still the aiyl okmotu that is in charge of water distribution.
This overview of the various actors in the current water governance structures shows that
these comprise state as well as non state actors at multiple levels (local, regional, national, and
international). Their specific role in and influence on water institutional reform will be shown
in chapter 6.3. Before turning to this, the next chapter will describe the main problems per
ceived and objectives formulated in water policies. It will be shown that these vary considera
bly among the listed actors.

6.2 Problem Perceptions and Policy Objectives

Turdakun Usulbaliev, from 1961 until 1985 First Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Kyrgyz SSR and until 2005 Member of Parliament, published a topic in the 1990s titled “Water
dearer than gold” (“voda dorozhe zolota” ). This title is indicative of the value attached to wa
ter resources in Kyrgyzstan. As Kyrgyzstan hardly possesses any noteworthy resources, the
economic significance of water in agriculture and hydropower is relatively high. Water is often
perceived as a national, strategic value and ideologically charged. More than a few interviewed
experts referred to the water resources of the country as “our only resource”, the “national
wealth”, or the Kyrgyz “heritage”. However, despite its rich water resources, water in Kyrgyzs
tan is perceived as being scarce. This scarcity is explained by the previously mentioned fact that
Kyrgyzstan only has the right to exploit a small amount of the water resources originating on
its territory due to regional agreements (see chapter 5.4.3). This leads to a sensation of injus
tice. The patterns of regional water distribution are considered a reason for water shortage in
Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, water governance is mainly perceived as a foreign policy issue.
Water is often compared to other resources such as oil, coal, and gas, especially when people
refer to its economic value. In addition to its economic importance, water is seen as a strategic
resource as Kyrgyzstan with its upstream location has a powerful position opposite the down
stream states (see ch. 5.4.3): “Under the conditions of the Central Asian republics water is the
most important strategic resource” (Dzhailobaev 2003: 71, translation JS).
The perception of water scarcity is astonishing in that Kyrgyzstan does not even use the
full water quota it is entitled to: Of the 11km³ allowed per year, Kyrgyzstan uses approximately
8 km³ (MISI, FES 2003: 7). Thus there is at least in the short term no 'objective' reason to
worry about more water. The rationale behind this perception is however also one of principle:
Kyrgyzstan would be denied its right to use its resources according to its own interests and
potential future needs. While other states possess full sovereignty over the usage of their re
sources, this would be denied to Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the question of reasonable sharing of
water resources is connected to the sensitive issue of national sovereignty and regional rela
tions. In addition, Kyrgyzstan must cover the costs of the operation and maintenance of reser
voirs, built in Soviet time on Kyrgyz territory but mainly serving the interests of irrigation