Building Failures - Failure Case Studies in Civil Engineering - page 101

technical cause of the failure was easy to understand. However, there were many
lessons for design and construction professionals. The important lessons involved
procedural issues. Clearly, there is a need for all parties to understand their
responsibilities and to perform their assignments competently. The structural
engineer's responsibility for overall structural integrity, including the performance of
connections was firmly established in this case. This failure also reinforced the need
for practices such as project peer review and constructability checks.
References
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