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Some studies have shown that not only neural mechanisms but also the cognitive
processes on which both imagining the past and looking into the future rely are
similar; both processes are strongly correlated (Addis et al. 2007 ; Schacter et al.
2012 ; Spreng and Grady 2010 ). This suggests that, existentially, outside of the
present moment of what is lived resides what is known. However, despite this,
research has shown that the phenomenological quality of the description of past
happenings is superior to that of the future. We are much richer when providing
sensorial details and localising events from the past (Bernsten and Boh 2010 ;
D'Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004 ; Gamboz et al. 2010 ; Grysman et al.
2013 ). It is perhaps because of this that we possess more literary or audiovisual
narratives about the past than about the future. It is perhaps also because of this that
we more frequently recur to our past and its experience for inspiration when we
represent our identity. Simulation of the future, in fact, is a much harder task than
remembering because, although both activities are related, imagining the future is
not a simple replica of past memories placed in new situations. Imagining what is
not known requires construction (we add that this is an expression of personal cre-
ativity), rather than recuperation. Moreover, it may require the creation of unfamil-
iar environments (Arnold et al. 2011 ).
In terms of the creation of one's own narratives, research in cognitive sciences
provides us with data for understanding why, and for what, we can create our own
versions of stories. For example, evidence sustains that we tend to consider future
events more positively than those of the past (Grysman et al. 2013 ): imagining the
future is guided by personal goals and expectations (D'Argembeau and Mathy
2011 ; Shao et al. 2010 ). The self, in consequence, has an organisational role. In fact,
both memories of the past and imagination of the future are guided by identity state-
ments arranged in temporal clusters that, in turn, refl ect how these characteristics of
identity were modelled in the past and expect to be modelled in the future (Rathbone
et al. 2011 ). Imagination of the future, in turn, is to a greater extent affect by self-
enhancement biases. We need to believe that our lives constantly evolve (Sedikides
and Gregg 2008 ). So, a large number of the narrations that project our identity
towards the future have at their core the idea that we have improved our circum-
stances and will improve them even more. Likewise, and coherent with temporal
self-appraisal theory (Wilson and Ross 2001 ), human beings feel the need to see
ourselves constantly evolving towards the point where we are capable of denigrat-
ing the past in order to exalt the present. For example, the presentation of narrations
of our past lives on Facebook may contain the idea not just that we have progressed,
but that our past was, at least, improvable. Finally, the process of remembering the
past and imagining the future supposes the application of knowledge of memory to
new and future situations, although this involves a bias that leads us to construct our
life histories around the idea of the perpetually improving self (D'Argembeau and
Van der Linden 2004 ), which achieves the desired goals (D'Argembeau and Mathy
2011 ; Shao et al. 2010 ). In line with theories that defend our tendency to exaggerate
optimism with regard to the future (Markus and Nurius 1986 ), our narrations regard-
ing the past will contain the idea that our past has been improved, our present is
being modifi ed and our future will be better for us all.
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