Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
To sum up the core argument of this section, I believe that virtual worlds that
are characterized by a few operative options for the users (or player-oriented
mechanics) and enforce simple, non-negotiable limitations to their experience
are recognized as viable communication tools and can, therefore, be utilized for
educational, philosophical and other various rhetorical purposes (propaganda,
training, advertisement, etc.). Digital simulations that, instead, embrace a freer
and more expressive approach to acting within virtual worlds can provide the
contexts for various kinds of experimentation including human-animal interac-
tion, the critical subversion of values, research in behavioural psychology,
performativity, etc.
The rest of this essay will only focus on the former, which is to say on articulat-
ing an understanding of virtual worlds as mediators and, more specifi cally, as philo-
sophical instruments. Towards that objective, I will introduce and analyse two
videogames with deliberate philosophical scopes and themes that I designed and
developed in the past few years.
When proposing computer simulations as viable instruments for the pursuit of
philosophical - or more widely intellectual - objectives, a frequently encountered
opposing line of reasoning contends that topics are (and always will be) necessary
and desirable on the basis that words afford the subtlety needed to symbolize and
organize complicated arguments. According to the detractors of the philosophical
use of simulations and videogames, virtual worlds cannot aspire to achieve the sub-
tlety and clarity of verbal and literal forms of expression. At this point in the devel-
opment of my argument, I believe it is important to clarify that this essay does not
advocate for the abandonment of text in favour of videogames, nor does it advance
the claim that computers are (or are ever going to be) the ultimate philosophical
media. In my opinion there are, however, no logical reasons why it would be ill-
advised to embrace a vaster and more compromising media horizon to develop, test
and divulge ideas.
With the objective of explaining why I consider it viable to tackle and disclose
philosophical notions, hypotheses and thought experiments through the activity of
'play', I will start by focusing on what I consider to be a fundamental quality that
playing and philosophizing have in common. In accordance with continental phi-
losophers such as Michel Foucault or Martin Heidegger, I understand philosophy as
a transformative practice. As a transformative practice, philosophy is not defi ned, in
its activity, by the specifi c ways in which its contents can be mediated (oral, textual,
visual, simulational, etc.) but rather by its capability to elicit a certain shift in behav-
iour or in perspective in a person engaging in it (Rayner 2007 ). In this sense, 'play'
and philosophy can be associated in terms of their transformative effects and pur-
poses. Both 'play' and philosophy are, moreover, traditionally considered as having
a fundamental importance in the education of individuals, the establishment of
social values as well as the development of culture by and large.
By defi nition, the capability of engendering a transformative effect is not a qual-
ity that can be objectively attributed to an artefact or a piece of work, but it is always
associated to the idea of being practically engaged in something, hence the term
'transformative practice'. The activities of painting, writing, designing, playing,
Search WWH ::




Custom Search