Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
Some approaches that have yielded interesting examples of computer colleagues
use mimicry, structured improvisation, and shared mental models. For example, the
improvisational percussion robot Shimon mimics human musicians by analyzing
the rhythm and pitch of musical performances and generating synchronized melodic
improvisations (Hoffman and Weinberg
2010
). In practice, the human and robot
develop a call-and-response interaction where each party modifi es and builds on
the previous contribution. Some co-creative agents use sensory input to construct
mental models of agents, actions, intentions, and objects in the environment
(Hodhod et al.
2012
). Mental models help agents effectively structure, organize,
interpret, and act on sensory data in real time, which is critical for meaningful
improvisation.
Although there are only a few examples of computer colleagues today, they raise
interesting questions about what it means to collaborate with a computer. These
projects also point to the need for a general cognitive theory of collaboration and
improvisational creativity that can be used to guide their interaction design and
software architectures. We contend that enaction can fulfi ll this need.
7.3
The Enactive Paradigm
In the following sections, we describe how the enactive approach reframes percep-
tion into an active and dynamic process critical for participatory sensemaking, i.e.,
negotiating emergent actions and meaning in concert with the environment and
other agents. Next, we examine the role of goals and planning in the enactive per-
spective. Finally, we review some sketching and design research to show evidence
that enaction plays a key role in the creative process when creative individuals
“think by doing.”
Enactive cognition is an outgrowth of the embodiment paradigm in cognitive
science. Embodiment claims cognition is largely structured by the manner in which
our bodies enable us to interact with the environment (Varela et al.
1991
). This
approach is contrasted with earlier cognitive theories that conceptualized the mind
as a machine and cognition as a complex but disembodied manipulation of symbolic
representations (Newell et al.
1959
). In particular, enaction emphasizes the role that
perception plays in guiding and facilitating emergent action (De Jaegher
2009
).
A short defi nition of enactivism by Havelange (
2010
) will help summarize this
distinction.
Here, cognition is no longer considered as a linear input/output sequence (as was
the case in classical cognitivism) but rather in terms of a dynamic sensorimotor loop
by taking into account the fact that actions themselves produce feedback effects on
subsequent sensations. Action is thus no longer a simple output; it becomes actually
constitutive of perception. What is perceived and recognized in perception are
the invariants of the sensorimotor loops, which are inseparable from the actions of
the subject.
