Neurocognitive Engineering for Systems’ Development - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 36

the growth and impact of information and communications technologies (Bond 1997;
Nordhaus 2007), as well as predictions of the continued growth in such technologies
in the near and mid-range future (Moravec 1998; Nordhaus 2001). This growth has, in
turn, stimulated the development and availability of devices that have revolutionized
the ability to produce, acquire, organize, retrieve, display, manipulate, and disseminate
information at levels that have been historically unprecedented. It has been estimated
that worldwide production of original information in 2002 was between 3.4 and 5.6
exabytes (1 exabyte = 10 18 bytes of information). They further provide some context: 5
exabytes of information is equivalent to about 37,000 times the size of the 17-million-
topic collection of the U.S. Library of Congress, or about 2,500 times the size of all of
the U.S. academic research libraries combined. Instead of focusing on the production
of new information, more recently, Bohn and Short (2012) estimated that in 2008,
Americans consumed approximately 3.6 zettabytes (1021 bytes), with the consumption
of information growing at an annual rate of 5.4% from 1980 to 2008.
It is widely maintained that the complexity of the current and future battlespace can
be addressed through the development and use of information and related computer
technologies, and thus, these technologies are considered vital for national security at the
highest political and scientific levels (National Research Council 1994; National Science
and Technology Council 1994). Specifically, it is envisioned that decision superiority
and information dominance can be realized through the development and effective
utilization of advanced information networks (Cotton 2005). Indeed, the development
of a Global Information Grid (GIG) was mandated in 2002 by Department of Defense
Directive 8100.1, “Global Information Grid Overarching Policy” (Zimet and Barry 2009).
In 2004, the National Military Strategy discussed the development of the GIG,
which would facilitate “information sharing, effective synergistic planning, and
execution of simultaneous, overlapping operations” (Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004). According to that analysis, the GIG “has the potential
to be the single most important enabler of information and decision superiority.”
Similarly, proposals for the Army's future forces also rely heavily upon an advanced
battlefield network to provide superior battlespace awareness and strategic and tacti-
cal advantages by providing precise and timely information of enemy and friendly
positions, capabilities, activities, and intentions (Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff 2004). Such information is intended, in turn, to make flexible, adap-
tive planning possible in the face of a complex, dynamic security environment. The
belief that information and communications technologies can support increased
operational capabilities appears to be both clear and pervasive, although alternative
perspectives have been expressed (Gentry 2002). By 2012, the GIG had become the
“principal common network backbone” for the implementation of network-centric
operations for the military (Zimet and Barry 2009).
INFORMATION INTENSITY AND CONSEQUENCES
FOR HUMAN PERFORMANCE
While the technological capabilities for collecting, processing, displaying, and dissemi-
nating information have dramatically increased over the past several decades, human
information processing capabilities have not increased in the same manner. The cognitive