Neurotechnology, Global Relations, and National Security - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 4

at the Manhattan Project and the “space race” for examples of this estate in practice.
But this framework did not restrict escalation, nor did it prevent continued threat
and/or far-reaching social effects (e.g., the Cold War; “Star Wars”-type defense con-
cerns; persistent danger of nuclear/radiological weapons), and so the triple-helix
approach may require modification(s) to facilitate stronger collaboration between
its constituents, on a scale that extends beyond national boundaries (Anderson et al.
2012; Giordano 2012a). I opine that an important aspect of this expanded approach
will entail increased involvement of both the humanities and the public (at least to
some reasonable extent), because real effect can only be leveraged through guide-
lines, laws, and policies that are sensitive to ethical and social ramifications, issues,
and problems that are relevant to those affected.
PARADOXES AND QUESTIONS
Here we encounter a number of paradoxical realities, which foster fundamental
questions, tensions, and even conflict about the ways that neuro S/T should be
regarded, studied, overseen, guided, employed, and/or restricted in NSID agendas.
For example, it could be claimed that certain forms of neuro S/T can—and perhaps
should—be utilized to define, predict, and, thereby, prompt intervention(s) to prevent
or minimize individual and/or group aggression, violence, and combativeness, and in
this way afford public protection (Farahany 2009; Greely 2013; Giordano et al. 2014).
How might such “protection” be balanced with individual and public privacy? To
protect against possible harms that might be incurred by use or misuse of neuro S/T in
NSID, it would be important to acquire and/or develop knowledge of real and poten-
tial threats posed by the use, misuse, and/or unintended consequences of neuro S/T in
NSID and squelch events before they escalate into scenarios that place the popula-
tion at risk of large-scale harm. How might the need for such research be balanced
with attempts at restricting its direct or dual use in NSID operations? It could be
argued that extant and perhaps newly developed international policies and trea-
ties that affect the conduct of neuro S/T research are viably important to prevent-
ing or limiting possible military use; yet, it is equally important to recognize that
international policies and signatory treaties do not guarantee cooperation (Gregg
2010) and may establish imbalances in capability and power that can subsequently
be exploited (Giordano et al. 2010; Benedikter and Giordano 2012; Brindley and
Giordano 2014).
To address such questions, we have advocated that neuro S/T continued to be stud-
ied for its potential viability—specifically to decrease harms necessary to preserve
national security and defense. In this light, we are developing a proposed set of crite-
ria for the consideration and possible use of neuro S/T in NSID settings (Bower and
Giordano 2012; Giordano et al. 2014), these include the following:
1. There is less harm done by using the neuro S/T in question.
2. If an individual(s) pose(s) a realistic and immediate threat of severe harm to
others, the most effective science and technology (including neuro S/T)—
and least harmful among these—should be utilized toward mitigating these
threats.