Can (and Should) We Regulate Neurosecurity? - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 255

O pTiOn T hree : w eak r egulaTiOn
An institution's conflict of interest committee provides another model of regulation.
In contrast to IRBs or IACUCs, conflict of interest committees do not have strong pow-
ers of approving/disapproving research or removing funding. Instead, conflict of inter-
est committees are notified by researchers of research involving a conflict of interest
by answering a few quick questions, such as whether or not a researcher stands to sig-
nificantly benefit financially from the research (on the order of $5000/year or more)
and/or whether or not a researcher stands to benefit financially from purchasing deci-
sions associated with the research. If a researcher does not have a significant conflict of
interest, the lack of a conflict is noted, and the researcher can continue his/her project.
Conversely, if a researcher does have a significant conflict of interest, the conflict of
interest committee works with the researcher to eliminate, reduce, or manage the con-
flict so that research can continue without the danger of it being corrupted (Shamoo
and Resnik 2009). This model may be regarded as weak regulation. This is not to say
that conflict of interest committees are weak; rather, it is a relative term to contrast the
design of conflict of interest committees with IRBs and IACUCs. If conflict of interest
committees find violations, the matter is reported to academic administration.
A weak regulatory model for military-purposed science would be as follows:
When academic researchers report their proposed research to the institution's office
of sponsored projects, the researcher answers a few quick questions just as s/he
would for conflicts of interest.
1. Is the research funded by the defense industry?
2. Is the intended purpose of the research to
a. kill, maim, or permanently disable persons?
b. covertly monitor persons? or
c. permanently alter persons?
If the researcher answers “no” to both questions, then the researcher continues with
his/her project. If the researcher answers “yes” to the first question (about defense
industry funding) but “no” to the second question (about purpose), then the military-
purposed research project is noted, but no action or management is necessary. If
the researcher answers “yes” to the first question and “yes” to the second about any
one of the purposes, then a committee (let us call it the “military-purposed science
committee”) works with the researcher to proceed appropriately. For instance, if the
research is designed to covertly monitor persons (via, say, some type of lie detection),
then the committee could put the researcher in touch with legal counsel to insure that
privacy laws are not (or could not be) violated through the use of technology. If the
research is designed to permanently alter persons (with, say, neuropharmacology),
then the committee could suggest adding a physician (psychiatrist) to the research
team to focus on the impact of such alterations. If the research is designed to kill,
maim, or permanently disable, then the committee could notify academic adminis-
tration that genuinely controversial research is being proposed, so that the institution
can decide whether or not this type of research is advocated and/or supported by the
university governance.