Military Neuroenhancement and Risk Assessment - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 246

is the first-generation problem” to consider: how do we understand that
something is an unacceptable risk unless some first generation has already
endured and suffered from it? How else could we obtain convincing objec-
tive evidence? (Lin et al. 2008).
With regard to the military use of neuroenhancements, the last standard seems
most plausible, given that it is most often defended in law and practice, despite the
first-generation problem. One solution could be to assert an ethical obligation for
extended testing of enhanced warfighters in a wide range of environments before
risking dangerous interaction between the enhanced and unenhanced. This testing
must be thorough, extensive, realistic, variegated, and come in stages, so that full
deployment with possible or actual civilian contact comes only at the end of a long
training regimen and safety inspection. From the risk-reward perspective of RBA, it
may very well be acceptable to deploy enhanced warfighters as soon as such exten-
sive testing indicated their mistakes, and other risks were, on average, no worse than
that of the typical human soldier.
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES
It should be noted that, unlike an RBA, an alternate view of risk is one that ignores
benefits entirely: a precautionary principle. Although it has been variously formulated
(Allhoff 2009), here is a representative statement of a strong version of the precau-
tionary principle: “When an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or
human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically” (Wingspread 1998).
Neuroenhancements that had not been adequately researched may violate this
version of the precautionary principle. Such a principle takes the uncertainty
inherent in RBA and in effect endorses a kind of “maximin” (or maximizing the
minimally acceptable results [Rawls 1971]) mode of assessing acceptable risk:
unless we can be sure the worst-case scenario will be acceptable, we ought not to
undergo the risk.
But taking this precautionary principle as a blueprint for risk assessment is vastly
at odds with standard procedures, not only in the military but also in civilian bio-
ethics. For instance, we do not in fact require that a new vaccine or other medical
treatment be guaranteed to produce no deaths or other negative side effects, and the
point of clinical trials is to attempt to establish cause-effect relationships, not to
completely prohibit use; there are well-understood circumstances in which an exper-
imental treatment may be made available before it is fully causally understood and
has full regulatory approval. And military necessity is one of those circumstances.
OTHER RISKS
A perpetual risk remains with respect to security issues for enhanced warfighters,
although the issues here are common to many aspects of technological culture. For
example, how susceptible would a neuroenhanced warfighter be to “hacking,” for
example, after capture? That is, especially given “arms race” concerns, are there