Military Neuroenhancement and Risk Assessment - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 244

There is yet a further risk factor that falls under “informed consent,” though not to
the warfighter but to other people. Is the risk—of enhancement malfunction, increased
probability of disproportionate violence or even war crime, or other harm—by neuroen-
hanced warfighters to enemy combatants required to be disclosed? Under usual interpre-
tations of the laws of armed conflict, there is no general “duty to disclose” the nature of
one's attack upon one's intended target, as long as it adheres to principles of discrimina-
tion and proportionality; surprise is well understood as a legitimate tactic in war.
But neuroenhancements may pose novel difficulties if they increase risk to unin-
tended targets—the noncombatants, specifically, the civilian population of the enemy,
or even of neutrals or one's own population while housing and training enhanced
warfighters. Is it morally permissible to have neuroenhanced warfighters who pose a
risk to civilian populations without informing the populations of the risk? For example,
suppose warfighters take drugs or other psychological enhancers that reduce inhibitions
and fear in order to enhance battlefield performance, but in a civilian setting, these
drugs cause more traffic accidents. This is reported to be exactly the risk with toxoplas-
mosis, a parasitic infection of interest to the military (Sapolsky and Vyas 2010).
The Affected Population
This leads us to consider that even if consent or informed consent for the warfighter
is not morally required with respect to human enhancements, we may need to focus
on the affected population as another factor in determining acceptable risk.
Who else is at risk, besides the enhanced soldiers themselves—does it include
groups that are particularly susceptible or innocent, such as the elderly or young chil-
dren, or merely those who broadly understand that their role with respect to enhance-
ments is risky, even if they do not know the particulars of the risk? In military terms,
civilians and other noncombatants are usually seen as not morally required to endure
the same sorts of risks as military personnel, especially when the risk is nonvoluntary
or involuntary. Will the use of military neuroenhancements pose the risk of any new
special, unacceptable harms to noncombatants?
An immediate issue pertains to the reliability of military neuroenhancements:
Will they degrade over time or have side effects that only slowly come to light? Will
they be easily reversible upon reentry into civilian life, or will their effects be perma-
nent? Will they have vast and/or unpredictable differences between different human
subjects? Will they exacerbate underlying physical or psychological problems, and
potentially cause physical or psychological difficulties for the loved ones, friends,
family, and communities of enhanced soldiers?
For instance, any neuroenhancements that increase aggression may then cause
warfighters to attack indiscriminately or disproportionately, similar in effect
to landmines as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and likewise
would be immoral to deploy. Even worse is when enhancements foreseeably may
cause damage outside a combat zone, for example, in ordinary interactions with
shopkeepers, friends, or family.
Seriousness and Probability
We thereby come to the two most basic facets of risk assessment: seriousness and
probability, that is, how bad would the harm be and how likely is it to happen?