Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Marchant and Gulley (2010) have pointed to a “reverse dual-use” dilemma
that adds to concerns about the use of neurotechnology for war and intelligence
gathering (see also Chapter 10). Such technology can be and is being brought
back into the civilian sector where its uses can threaten civil liberties and com-
monly held values (Arike 2010). Surveillance drones are now being used by police
forces in the United States, and there may soon be pressure to arm such drones.
As with the initial arming of military surveillance drones, logic suggests that you
“neutralize” an enemy or malefactor once you have them in view. A French com-
pany has, for example, proposed arming drones with tasers to capture criminals
(Singer 2012). “Less lethal” technology for use against enemy soldiers is being
brought home for domestic law enforcement and crowd control (Arike 2010). The
recent strengthening of the relationship between military and police facilitates
this transfer of war and intelligence gathering technology into the civilian sector
(Baker 2011).
The brief description in the preceding paragraphs and more extensive discussion
elsewhere in this volume and in the literature make clear that neuroscience can
be applied to “National Security” in many ways and that these applications have
serious social, ethical, and legal consequences (Wheelis and Dando 2005; British
Medical Association 2007; Marks 2010; Giordano and Wurzman 2011; DARPA-
BAA-11-65 2012; Giordano 2012; The Royal Society 2012; Tennison and Moreno
2012; see also Chapter 7). Concern over these issues is reflected in some of the titles
of recent reports and articles such as “Biologists napping while work militarized”
(Dando 2009), “A Faustian bargain” (Rose 2011), and “Neurobiology, a case study
of the imminent militarization of biology” (Wheelis and Dando 2005). The prob-
lems are heightened by the likelihood that much of the current work on applications
of neuroscience to “National Security” is classified and the current state of such
applications is not fully known.
THE PLEDGE AND NEUROSCIENTISTS
The pledge is one approach that is open to neuroscientists concerned about neu-
rotechnology applications to “National Security.” Other approaches include the
following:
1. Development of awareness through education and discussion is a nec-
essary first step, but only a first step. The danger is in relying on this
approach and burying the issues in academic courses, conferences, and
journal articles.
2. Development of committees or working groups to examine the issue and
consider ethical parameters that might guide work on “National Security”
applications or legislation. A committee of the British Royal Society has,
for example, recently issued a report that includes recommendations for
national and international oversight of applications of neuroscience to mili-
tary and law enforcement agencies (The Royal Society 2012). Comparable
reports by committees of the U.S. National Research Council have also
been published, although these reports are mainly about the ways in which
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