Between Neuroskepticism and Neurogullibility - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 220

The literature provides an extended discussion and debate about the relation-
ship between science, culture, and technology. We can recognize that one of the
most important tenets established within the philosophy of technology over the
last century has been the absolute novelty of the technological approach to reality.
The new, more empirically oriented philosophy of technology as developed both
in America and post-World War II technocentric nations (many of which are now
aligned as U.S. allies) during the last 30 years speaks to the coevolution of technol-
ogy and society; this does not view technology as autonomous, but instead seeks to
explicate the numerous social forces that give rise to—and act upon—technology
(as both construct and activity) (Ihde 2009). The differences between the classical
view of technology and the understanding offered by contemporary philosophy of
technology can be summarized in three ways.
First is to note how classical philosophy of technology tended to be concerned
with technology overall and not specific technology (Achterhuis 2001). The classical
philosophers of technology were more occupied with the historical and transcenden-
tal conditions that made modern technology possible and tended to be less concerned
about the real changes accompanying the development of a technological culture
(Giordano 2012). Therefore, if and when analyzing neuro technology, we must face
the real changes that its development for national defense and security produce an
understanding of what the said technologies can and cannot really do.
Second is a view (Achterhuis 2001; Ihde 2009) that avoids dystopian interpretations
of technology: In effect, we must understand this new wave of neurotechnology, rather
than to reject it nostalgically in demanding a return to some prior, seemingly more har-
monious and less problematic relations with technological artifacts for national defense
and security.
Third, a somewhat new philosophy of technology assumes a more empirical—or
concrete—turn. This enables an understanding of technological development not as
an independent force that externally impinges upon society, related only to scien-
tific knowledge (as neuroskepticism and neurogullibility tend to assume), but rather,
views technology as a social activity in and of itself, which reflects the particulars of
setting in time and place, and arises from the dreams, purposes, and relationships of
people (Achterhuis 2001).
Thus, it is more neurotechnology than neuroscience that raises moral, ethical,
and legal questions and problems. If viewed in this way, neurotechnology can be
seen to be not so much a question, but an answer: technological artifacts (everything
that is human-made) summarize in themselves the answers that humankind gave to
a provocative reality in a certain time and place (Schein 2010). According to Schein
(2010), neurotechnology can be analyzed at several different levels, with the “term”
level referring to the degree to which the neurotechnologic phenomenon is visible to
the observer. Some of the confusion surrounding the definition of what neurotech-
nology really is results from not differentiating the levels at which it is manifest.
These levels range from very tangible, overt manifestations that one can see and
feel, to more deeply embedded, unconscious, basic assumptions that can be defined
as the “essence” of neurotechnology. Between these layers are various espoused
beliefs, values, norms, and rules of behavior that members of a culture (as users of
neurotechnology) employ as ways of depicting neurotechnology to selves and others