Prison Camp or “Prison Clinic?” - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 213

The other avenue for continuing exploration arises given that a biopolitical analysis
of neuroethics and national security expands inquiry outside of the field of neurosci-
ence. There are two interconnected ways with which to engage this expansion. The
first is to acknowledge that even if we were able to halt the use of fMRI at the gates of
Guantanamo and elsewhere, it will still be the case that medical technology will creep
out of its “proper place” in an effort to support the national security agenda. The DoD
and DHS are just as likely to use surgical procedures, nonneurological screening, and
chemical treatments as they are to utilize functional neuroimaging (Sydney Morning
Herald 2007). 15 Remember, the requirement for use of medical technology in the prison
camp is effectiveness. If other technologies show more promise, then the State will most
likely abandon imaging for more fruitful medical procedures. Those neuroethicists who
are interested in what they call illegitimate uses of medical technology (in a norma-
tive sense) will need to expand their focus in an effort to capture this fact. This point
is hardly problematic, although it will likely require a larger coalition of ethicists and
experts due to the expanded medical scope.
The second aspect of expansion pushes the traditional neuroethicist a bit further
outside the usual area and focus of expertise and into the field of political philosophy
(McDermott 2009). 16 If my analysis is correct in revealing the cause of DoD and
DHS interest in neuroscience, then we have moved beyond the field of neuroeth-
ics alone and into the much broader field of political studies. I have proposed that
the issue of fMRI-based lie detection in Guantanamo Bay is a symptom of a much
larger problem, namely that of biopower and State racism. Efforts to tackle the prob-
lems posed by Marks and others would require substantial efforts to understand and
overcome what any reasonable person would consider to be the negative aspects
of biopolitical intervention. This is not to say that we must tear the whole system
down and start again, even though some Foucauldians may argue that biopower is so
deeply entrenched in modern democracy that there is no other option. We can chal-
lenge the government when we see the abuse of vulnerable populations, always with
the mind-set that they face a danger so extreme it threatens to crush their status as
human beings. This problem seems to be much bigger than illegitimate uses of neu-
roimaging. It cuts to the core of institutionalized State racism, and any future efforts
to address this issue should take this fact into consideration. In other words, it is not
enough for the neuroscientific and neuroethical community to simply say “keep your
hands off our technology.” These communities must conjoin their expertise to other
disciplines' in an effort to solve what appears to be a systemic issue in the modern
national security setting.
It is easy to describe Foucault's work as overly pessimistic, as a series of con-
nected descriptive accounts that offer no escape from existing power structures.
With no clear “up side” to his writings, one may be tempted to dismiss his work
as mere cynical musings; or if one takes these writings seriously to abandon any
project aimed at transcending the injustices inscribed in the state apparatus. It is my
contention that neither response is appropriate. This biopolitical analysis has shown
how we can avoid preemptive dismissal and deep despair. Descriptive accounts such
as Foucault's help us to understand why the United States would attempt to bring
neuromedical technology into Guantanamo Bay. It shows us why the prison camp
takes on the character of a prison clinic. With this understanding, we can seek to