Prison Camp or “Prison Clinic?” - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 207

encouraged. We look at those who fight against authoritarian regimes as heroes, as
those who are willing to sacrifice all they have in the name of liberation. The Arab
Spring is an excellent example of this trend. Last but not least, State-sponsored rac-
ism conjures up images of genocide which carry a substantial amount of normative
weight. In short, it may be that Foucault is cheating with his account. He is sneaking
value-laden content through the back door.
In response, one could claim that it is impossible for us to completely separate
words such as “domination” and “resistance” from some sort of moral valuation.
However, this methodological concern does not seriously undermine Foucault's
account. We are free to make whatever ethical claims we like based upon the vari-
ous ways in which biopower manifests itself. Foucault cannot, and did not, attempt
to block such action in any significant way. The following is evidence of this claim:
The problem is not of trying to dissolve them (relations of power) in the utopia of
perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules of law, the
techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ethos , the practice of self, which
would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.
(Foucault 1988, 18) 12
It is simply the case that Foucault himself did not aim to label biopolitical power
structures as good or evil. It was not his concern.
The second concern is a result of how Foucault characterizes power structures in
society. According to Foucault, power flows throughout the community in a remark-
ably decentralized fashion. That is to say, Foucault does not discuss power as it is
wielded by one party against another. Biopower (and its complimentary structure
disciplinary power) circulate through the community in a way that resists zeroing in
on those who hold the reigns. To put it another way, discussing power in relation to
those who control government structures is unimportant for Foucault. This approach
is somewhat problematic. It seems obvious to most that power is not something
which spontaneously circulates throughout society. It is something which is held by
one group and exercised against another. To use the current case, one would not say
that biopolitical intervention enters Guantanamo Bay on its own. It is a function of
the State which we can trace back to specific leaders and specific decrees. Examples
range from Nazi leadership in the Holocaust to the Public Health Service in the
Tuskegee experiments. As a result, Foucault's refusal to acknowledge this central-
ized characteristic of power seems to complicate his overall account.
There is a response to this concern. It is not the case that Foucault's account suc-
ceeds or fails based upon the acceptance of a wholly decentralized model of power.
The important point is that these power structures outlast those who control the
State. They are characteristics of the modern State, not characteristics tied to par-
ticular leaders. In this light, Foucault's reluctance to discuss the “who” of biopower
makes more sense. Focusing on the “who” implies that individual leaders or groups
of leaders are the font of biopolitical intervention, and as such when power shifts
from one leadership group to another the preexisting power structures shift as well.
This is a claim which Foucault would deny, and one which we can reasonably deny as
well. While it is true that societies have changed the way in which power is utilized,