Neuroskepticism - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 194

e Thics and h uman r ighTs
Bentwich (2010) posits that the answers to these problems are “not found in the
jurisdiction of neuroethics, but rather by reasserting human rights and constitu-
tional civil liberties.” In other work on neuroscience and national security, I too have
emphasized the importance of human rights (see, e.g., Marks 2007b). More broadly,
I have also advocated human rights impact assessments of counterterrorism policies
(Marks 2006) and used international human rights law to critique health profession-
als who are complicit in detainee abuses (Marks 2007a). However, I do not believe
that professional ethics is an entirely autonomous enterprise. In other recent work,
I elaborate more fully on the relationship between human rights and professional
ethics (Marks 2012). I also note that the American Association for the Advancement
of Science (AAAS) and Human Rights Program recognizes the centrality of human
rights to the ethics of science, and its coalition explores how greater attention to
human rights might also result in improvements in scientific process and practice
(AAAS 2010).
T he p rOspecTs f Or and l imiTs Of f urTher d iscOurse
I am heartened by the lively debate that my work has provoked. I encourage my col-
leagues to work with me to take this discussion beyond the pages of this volume and
into the larger public domain. I acknowledge, as Lowenberg and colleagues (2010)
and Giordano (2010b) point out, that national security considerations may place lim-
its on what may be discussed in public. But the presumption should be in favor of
openness, and there is—in any event—more than enough information in the public
domain about which to conduct meaningful discussions.
In these discussions, the neuroscience and neuroethics communities must be
frank with the public about the potential, the limitations, and the perils of neurosci-
ence. We should empower the public to challenge decisions regarding the develop-
ment and application of neuroscience (see Dickson 2000) and engage with them
in figuring out the road ahead. The educational and communication challenges in
this exercise should not be underestimated. But we should rise to them. If we fail
to reconsider and refocus the gaze of neuroscience, we risk abandoning or—worse
still—imperiling the vulnerable. And if we do that, tomorrow's historians and sci-
ence studies scholars will, rightly, not look kindly on us.
NOTES
1. This chapter is based on a plenary lecture of the same title delivered at the Novel Tech
Ethics Conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in September 2009. The author is indebted
to the conference organizers—in particular, Jocelyn Downie and Francoise Baylis—for
extending this invitation and providing him with the opportunity to develop his views.
2. Documents on file with author.
3. The term is my own, but it draws some inspiration from the notion of “technoscientific
imaginaries.” See Marcus (2005).