Neuroskepticism - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 191

the misuse of biological research. Such a committee could certainly play a role in
the oversight of national security neuroscience if it had the authority to monitor the
misuse of neuroscience within—as well as outside—government. But in my view,
the time has also come for a broader public debate about the legitimate nonclinical
applications of neuroscience—one that takes into account the concerns addressed
here and seeks to learn from the abuse of medicine, behavioral psychology, and
polygraphy in the national security context.
If we are to have a meaningful discussion, we will have to ask ourselves some dif-
ficult questions that explore the kinds of neuroscience research that are being funded
and address the broader context in which that research takes place. For example,
many of us do not blink at the use of brain imaging to detect lies in detainees.
In contrast, no one advocates the use of the technology during U.S. Senate hearings
for nominees to the federal judiciary. Surely, the detection of an answer “contrary to
truth” in such a context might be of some interest to the senators charged with the
confirmation of federal judges!
I am, of course, not the first to make this kind of point. Commenting on the fMRI-
based research to screen children for potentially violent behavior, the sociologist
Troy Duster (2008) has noted that studies are “not designed to capture the kind of
diffuse, anonymous violence reflected in the behavior of unscrupulous executives,
traders, subprime lenders and so on.” It is tempting to add to the list the arm's-
length architects of torturous interrogation, and the legal and health professionals
who—purportedly exercising their professional skill and judgment—approved or
facilitated their use.
Duster continues with more than a hint of sarcasm:
But for the sake of argument, suppose we could monitor children and determine that
greater activity in the prefrontal cortex means that they are likely to exhibit violent
behavior. Surely, then, we should scan preteens to intervene in the lives of potential
Enron-style sociopaths before they gut the pensions of the elderly, right? Oops, I guess
I have the wrong target group in mind. (Duster 2008, B4)
In this piece, Duster applies to recent neuroscience research some of the criticism
that social activist Martin Nicolaus directed at sociologists and criminologists in
1968, roughly paraphrased as “you people have your eyes down and your hands up,
while you should have your eyes up and your hands down.” He explains:
'Eyes down' meant that almost all the research on deviance and crime was focused on
the poor and their behavior, while 'hands up' meant that the support for such research
was coming from the rich and powerful—from foundations, the government, and cor-
porations. Conversely, of course, 'eyes up' meant turning one's research focus to the
study of the pathological behavior of the elite and privileged, and 'hands down' meant
giving more of a helping hand to the excluded, impoverished, and disenfranchised.
(Duster 2008, B4-B5)
Although Duster does not address how neuroscience might help the disenfran-
chised, it is not difficult to conjure other uses of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
technologies that might redound to their benefit (including perhaps the provision