Neuroscience, National Security, and the Reverse Dual-Use Dilemma - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 175

conduct an initial assessment and only proceed to a full CIAS for technologies that
are reasonably likely to have a significant adverse civilian impact. Findings of no
significant impact would be reviewed by one office within the Pentagon to ensure
that offices are not ducking their CIAS responsibility by unreasonably downplaying
societal impacts. For projects that are subject to the full CIAS, the sponsoring entity
would be required to identify potential impacts on the civilian sector and to identify
potential alternatives for mitigating, managing, or avoiding those impacts.
This proposed CIAS requirement may seem like an unduly burdensome and
bureaucratic imposition on first impression, but given the transformative impacts
some of the emerging military-developed technologies in neuroscience and others
may have, this new burden may be necessary to avoid much greater hardship. While
not perfect, this proposal is likely to improve the reverse dual-use dilemma. The
internal education/awareness function may be most important. It is likely that the
scientists, engineers, funders, project managers, and implementation decision makers
give very little consideration to civilian sector impacts. Experience with programs
intended to increase awareness of dual-use concerns among civilian scientists finds
that the greater awareness that the researchers have about the potential risks, the more
likely they are to think through risk reduction and avoidance (Davidson et al. 2007).
Presumably, the requirement to identify, and possible alternatives to reduce or avoid,
adverse civilian impacts of the technologies they are working on will spur military
scientists to also be more sensitive to potential problems associated with their work.
The external benefit of a NEPA-like assessment process in informing the public
and triggering the political process where appropriate is likely to be more difficult
for the CIAS process. For one thing, the CIAS will often involve classified or sensi-
tive information, since it involves the assessment for risks associated with power-
ful technologies with military or national security applications that are still in the
development stage. Thus, full public disclosure may not be warranted. Moreover,
the biggest criticism of NEPA is that it provides an opportunity for judicial review
that is used to delay many projects. Such a mechanism would be inappropriate for
important military technologies as it could jeopardize important national security
objectives, and so CIAS should not be judicially reviewable. Of course, the cost of
eliminating judicial enforcement is reduction in the incentives to take seriously the
CIAS process and requirements. To provide some enforcement, there would need
to be some independent review process for the CIAS. Perhaps a committee with
appropriate security clearances set up under the auspices of the National Academy of
Sciences or similar institution could serve as the CIAS review mechanism.
Regardless of what institutional form is adopted, the substantive criteria and actions
that might be considered as a less-damaging alternative are probably the most difficult
aspect of the reverse dual-use problem. It would be difficult to convince or require
the military to forgo most militarily beneficial technologies in order to avoid future
civilian impacts, especially if military adversaries are likely to develop similar tech-
nologies themselves. While relinquishment may be an appropriate remedy in extreme
cases, most examples will likely require a different policy approach such as trying
to restrict the technology to legitimate military applications through classification or
other measures, preparing and educating civilian policy makers, law enforcement offi-
cials, and other relevant stakeholders about the potential disruptive technologies on the