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of a fentanyl opiate during the Moscow theater siege in 2002 (Wheelis and Dando
2005; Dando 2009). From a purely military perspective, there are applications of
such technologies that would be both beneficial and arguably ethical, such as peace-
fully controlling a potentially hostile local population during a military operation
in order to reduce both military and civilian casualties. Again, though, what would
happen if such technologies could be acquired by the general public? A recent
report by the Royal Society in the United Kingdom warned that “[t]he development
of incapacitating chemical agents also increases the proliferation of these weapons
and the risk of acquisition by rogue states, terrorists or criminals” (Royal Society
2012). Do we want to give terrorists, aspiring bank robbers, and rebellious teenag-
ers the power to cheaply and relatively easily alter the behavior and perhaps well-
being of other people? Obviously not, but are those not probable scenarios if we
develop such agents?
There are no doubt many other examples of military neuroscience research that
present reverse dual-use concerns. For example, the use of noninvasive brain stimu-
lation technologies to interrogate unwilling participants may be justifiable in certain
military contexts (although even that is debatable), whereas such uses for involun-
tary interrogations in the civilian sector would undoubtedly be seen as objectionable
(Heinrichs 2012).
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The examples provided above are merely illustrative. They are intended to demonstrate
that emerging technologies in the neurosciences and other scientific fields being devel-
oped by the military for legitimate national security objectives could have disruptive
and destructive impacts if allowed to flow freely into the civilian sector. There is no
indication that the military is considering the potential future civilian implications of
these technologies, as this has never been part of their mission or responsibility up until
now. Our national security agencies have been given the challenging task of protecting
the nation from external threats, which include pursuing technologies that will help
them carry out that mission.
Of course, the civilian applications of military neuroscience innovations will
not be all negative, there will be some positive benefits as well, such as the poten-
tial assistance to quadriplegics from brain-machine interface technologies being
developed by the military (Weinberger 2012). Yet, as the power of emerging tech-
nologies continue to grow, the potential detrimental impacts also grow, even if the
positive impacts likewise grow. If the longer-term civilian implications of military
technologies are not addressed at the formative stages when such technologies
are first being considered, shaped, and developed, we run the very real danger of
blindly committing ourselves to a future we do not want (Moreno 2004). How can
this problem be addressed? No obvious and simple solutions present themselves.
The most logical approaches would be a review mechanism either inside or outside
the military establishment. Either approach would have its limitations. An internal
review mechanism would have the benefit of better access to classified information
and the technology developers, but may not have the independence and freedom
to raise tough questions about technological developments that might be beneficial
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