Neuroscience, National Security, and the Reverse Dual-Use Dilemma - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 169

controlled assassin “insect”? Of course, the power of these UAVs need not stop with
surveillance, but can and is being extended to create weaponized vehicles capable of
targeted killings or mass murder (Marchant et al. 2011; Wan and Finn 2011). Again,
not the kind of technology that one would want to be easily and widely available.
There are many other emerging examples of the reverse dual-use problem.
Another example is the recent development and deployment of the malware viruses
nicknamed “Stuxnet” and “Flame” to spy on and disrupt the Iranian nuclear
weapon program. A string national security case can be made in support of these
efforts to at least delay the development and potential use of a nuclear bomb by Iran
that could kill millions of innocent lives. At the same time, if this same technol-
ogy was to become available to civilians and terrorist groups, the damage could be
equally if not more severe. According to one media description of the Flame pro-
gram, it is “designed to replicate across even highly secure networks, then control
everyday computer functions to send secrets back to its creators. The code could
activate computer microphones and cameras, log keyboard strokes, take screen
shots, extract geolocation data from images, and send and receive commands and
data through Bluetooth wireless technology” (Nakashima et al. 2012). It is easy to
imagine how such a powerful technology could wreak havoc if it could get into the
wrong hands.
The first rebound effect would be if other nations use the technology and precedent
set by Stuxnet and Flame to launch their own cyber-attacks against U.S. resources—
these programs “will invite imitation and retaliation in kind, and it has established
new and disturbing norms for state aggression on the Internet and in its side channels.
American and Israeli official action now stands as a justification for others. In national
security as in much, what goes around often comes around” (Coll 2012). An even
more disruptive effect would occur if or when individual citizens can obtain and use
similar cyber-attack technologies, whether it be the thrill-seeking teenage hacker,
spurned or jealous lovers, industrial espionage agents, or full-blown terrorists intent
on inflicting unparalleled economic and physical harm to the U.S. infrastructure.
MILITARY NEUROSCIENCE
While the development of applied neuroscience is in its infancy, the long-term
applications and impacts of neuroscience are likely to be both powerful and pro-
found (National Research Council 2009). Military and intelligence agencies, with
the most at stake from such applications in terms of both benefits and risks, recog-
nize the potential of neuroscience to revolutionize intelligence-gathering and warfare
(National Research Council 2009). According to one estimate, the U.S. Department
of Defense expenditures on neuroscience exceeded $350 million in 2011 (Tennison
and Moreno 2012). The national security establishment has the time, money, and
mission needs to explore the cutting edge of neuroscience research and applications.
With budgets running to billions of dollars per year, the luxury of no hard dead-
lines, and the ever-pressing need to innovate technology to maintain the U.S. global
edge in military technology and capability, U.S. military research entities such as
the DARPA can pursue particular lines of research for as long as they are inclined
(Moreno 2004; Royal Society 2012).