Issues of Law Raised by Developments and Use of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 154

of addition” of five dominant means. Liang and Xiangsu posit that nations
should use “all means, including armed force or nonarmed force, military
and nonmilitary, and lethal and nonlethal means to compel an enemy to
accept one's interests” (Lang and Xiangsui 2007). Their approach envi-
sions a world in which “a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is
better suited to be a modern solider than a strong young-lowbrow with bulg-
ing biceps” (Lang and Xiangsui 2007). In short, they envision the use of
scientists, technicians, mathematicians, and other nonmilitary parties to
achieve military goals—including, presumably, developers and users of
neu rote ch nolog y.
That vision arguably ignores or rejects international norms for the use
of weaponized neurotechnology. It raises profound questions about (1) what
precautions other nations might or might not take in developing weapon-
ized neurotechnology (at least for passive or active defense), (2) military
doctrines, and (3) how LOAC might be interpreted in addressing nations
who embrace the notion of unrestricted warfare. Indeed, avoiding the cata-
strophic consequences of war, especially to noncombatants, is a principal
reason that most nations respect the LOAC.
A new set of rules governing weaponized neurotechnology for offensive
or defensive purposes must be established that can achieve some interna-
tional consensus in order to minimize, if possible, the risks of engagement
or conflict. That will not be easy to accomplish.
7. The corollary to the above question is at what point does use of weaponized
neurotechnology constitute a “use of force” under Article 2 of the United
Nations Charter?
The use of the Stuxnet malware put into question the existing discourse
over U.S. doctrines of active offense versus defense of weaponized malware
(Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, 2012). Although dealing with weaponized
code, the strategic and legal considerations under international law parallel
those for neurotechnology. Stuxnet has shown that the United States (and
Israel) will use cyber weapons offensively. 51
The United States' cyber strategies respect international law and there is
no reason to believe that such a stance would not apply to neurotechnology.
The key normative standards are set forth in the United Nations Charter
Articles 2(4) and 51. Article 2(4) prohibits the “threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity of independence of any state”. Article 51 states that
nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of
the United Nations (Charter of the United Nations 1945).
But force is not defined. No international convention defines whether
the employment of weaponized neurotechnology constitutes a use of
force. Probably, the term covers attacks that injure persons or irreparably
damage property. Apparently, the U.S. government viewed employment
of Stuxnet as a use of force. The intent was to irreparably damage criti-
cal infrastructure used to develop nuclear technology and, presumably,
weapons. The tenor of the operation and strategic intent—and statements