Brain Brinksmanship - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 123

included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and information environment within the operational areas and areas of
interest.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2011). So where this definition is the allow-
ance for neuroweaponry or similar kinds of mind-altering, influencing, or redirecting
systems of modern warfare? Should we assume it is axiomatically included within the
broad ambit of the definition provided?
Such a definition falls short even when dealing with the known spectrum of
cyberwarfare. One aspect related to this categorical problem is defining the strategic
frontiers for future national defense purposes. Other strategic frontiers beyond outer
and cyberspace include frontiers in nanospace, genomic space, and “neurospace.”
Conceivably, these are legitimate domains for future conflict because they are as yet
ungoverned spaces akin to their geographical counterparts. They reflect a no-man's
land of unrestricted activity where hostile and benign activities are equally permis-
sible. No formal doctrinal definitions of these new realms of security activity and
frontiers of geostrategic thought have been devised thus far. If these are genuine stra-
tegic frontiers, a main issue is determining where neuroscience fits into the existing
operational definition of redefined battlespace. Certainly, we have seen both outer
space and cyberspace progressively redefined as part of the strategic battlespace.
In the physical world, battlespace is well known and its parameters defined.
Similarly, an act of aggression or war in the physical sense is just as well defined. That
is not the case when it comes to potentially novel and unexplored battlespaces.
Federal officials, military leaders, policy scholars, and security experts are all look-
ing at this issue and struggling to answer the question—what constitutes an act of
war in these new battlespaces? Kevin Coleman (2008) argues:
The contemporary definition of “battlespace” is, in my opinion, too confining.
Battlespace is often defined as a three-dimensional area—width, depth, and airspace.
Its fourth dimension of time and distance, tempo and synchronization, is also already
considered, as is the radio frequency (RF) spectrum. The battlespace's fifth dimen-
sion is cyberspace, an area where battles will be fought anonymously but tenaciously.
However, the overlooked but critical and dynamic factor of the twenty-first century bat-
tlespace is the human factor. This proposed “sixth dimension” of human factors includes
leadership, motivation, ingenuity, and patience—factors that shape every aspect of the
battlespace from the application of force through the effect of bandaging a child's hand.
Thus, it is fair to raise questions of whether neuroweapons constitute yet a seventh
dimension beyond the cognitive and behavioral, or do weaponized neurotechnolo-
gies lie within the sixth dimension residing as it does in the broad array of human
factors as described? Arguments that place neuroweaponry in the seventh dimen-
sion are rooted in psychology, perception, and interpretation of phenomenon that
go beyond behavioral and autonomic responses and actions. These are thoughts,
behaviors, and perceptions that are formulated on the basis of interpreted reality
and external stimuli. According to Richardson, this dimension deals with com-
plex thinking and situational assessment of novel conditions, options, and activi-
ties that engage emotion, motivation, ingenuity, and patience. It is the frontier
of self-consciousness and rational mental operations (Posner and Russell 2005;
Davidson and Begley 2012). This underscores one of the many issues embedded