“NEURINT” and Neuroweapons - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 107

In all cases, paralysis occurs rapidly after introduction of a small dose of the
agent, and the victim remains conscious until overcome by shock and/or respiratory
arrest. As well, except for the naja toxins (for which there are a number of species-
specific antivenins, each of which differ in effectiveness), antidotes are not available;
rapid triage for cardiorespiratory support is required to prevent mortality (although
the effects of tetrodotoxin can be mitigated with edrophonium) (Masaro 2002).
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND PREPARATIONS
The use of such neuroweapons, especially if apparent, is unlikely to result in last-
ing peace. Yet, the distribution of a neurotropic drug or neuropathological agent
throughout a population could create a societal burden that significantly impacts
the means, economic resources, and/or motivations to fight. But there is also the
risk of a number of “spillover effects.” First, given the environment(s) in which
most current warfare is conducted, it would be nearly impossible to completely
protect a civilian population from the effects of neuroweapons. If the agent has
a known antidote or may be inoculated against, effects might be relatively easy
to counter—but this would depend upon the integrity of the public health infra-
structure of the town or country in which the agents are employed (and/or the
capability of military forces to provide medical assistance to those civilians that
are affected). Second, if an antidote is not available, then there is risk of both
serious collateral injury to the civilian population and to one's own troops should
they be exposed to the agent. Third, there is risk to much broader populations
if stocks of the agent were purloined from secure storage or should a neuromi-
crobiological agent mutate while being employed (NAS 2008). Evidently, these
considerations prompt ethical and legal concerns that must be addressed—and
resolved—through the formulation of guidelines and policies, as discussed else-
where in this volume.
While the use of neurotechnology in NSID applications may be relatively new,
the concept of using psychological science to develop weaponry is not. In some
ways, it may be as difficult to distinguish between neurotechnical and psychological
warfare as it is to discriminate structure from function as relates to brain and mind.
“Changing minds and hearts” may not be a task that is best addressed by neuro-
technologies as weapons. Instead, cultural sensitivity and effective communication
might be a more desirable approach (Masaro 2002; Freakley 2005; NAS 2008).
Still, neurotechnology will be evermore viable in translating the nuances of social
cognition and behaviors and thus gaining a deeper understanding as to why certain
principles or violations are more or less likely to induce violence and/or strong
opposition. Neurotechnology could—and likely will—play an increasingly larger
role in exploring the relationships between culture and neuropsychological dynam-
ics in and between populations.
But here we pose a caveat: Ignoring unresolved ambiguities surrounding issues
of the “brain-mind” and “reductionist/antireductionist” debate (i.e., as connoted by
the “neuro” prefix) when employing scientific evidence as rationale for employing
neurotechnologies as weapons may lead to erroneous conclusions that may profoundly
affect the intelligence and defense community—and the public. An example is the