“NEURINT” and Neuroweapons - Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense - page 91

cybernetic technology will confirm the feasibility of engineering human-machine
systems that could be of value in several of the aforementioned NSID tasks and
challenges.
NEUROTECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
Strategic intelligence is defined as gathering and analyzing information regarding
the capacities and intentions of foreign countries; it may also encompass political
intelligence, given that “. . . [political intelligence] is at once the most sought-after
and the least reliable of the various types of intelligence. Because no one can predict
with absolute certainty the effects of the political forces in a foreign country, analysts
are reduced to making forecasts of alternatives based on what is known about politi-
cal trends and patterns” (Pringle 2009). The complex dynamics of political forces
that contribute to such predictive difficulty are due, in part, to the numerous and var-
ied agents involved, all of whose actions are individually determined. Thus, under-
standing the biopsychosocial factors that influence individual and group dynamics
and being able to detect these variables with high ecological validity (i.e., “in the
field,” under real-world conditions) are important to both descriptive/analytic and
predictive intelligence approaches ( vide infra ).
A combination of (1) advanced sociocultural neuroscientific models of individual-
group dynamics based upon theories of complexity adapted for use(s) in anthropology,
(2) sufficient computing and BMI frameworks (perhaps as speculated above), and
(3) certain forms of neuroimaging to accurately detect the mental states and decision-
biases of key or representative individuals might enable dramatically improved
forecasting of behavior patterns that are influential to sociopolitical change. These
forecasts could include the description of: mental states of specific agents/actors, the
propagation dynamics of an idea or cultural construct, and/or node-edge interactions
of individuals and cohorts—any and all of which might be viable to subsequently
identify specific targets for manipulation (via other neuroweapons).
However, intentions , as opposed to corresponding cognitive and/or emotional
states and their associated neuronal signatures, are difficult to detect using existing
neurotechnologies. This affects and alters the modeling approaches that could—
and should—be used to describe or predict individual or group activities. As well,
it is important to consider the potential of technological interventions to alter
events. Here, lessons may be garnered from experience with psychological warfare
(Goldstein 1996). Sometimes, techniques and tactics will induce unintended, if not
frankly contrary effects and results. Given the overarching applications of neurologi-
cally and psychologically viable approaches, there is interest in neurotechnology to
augment the role, capability, and effect(s) of psychological operations (PSYOPs) as
a “force multiplier” in both political and military tactics. This trend began with the
1985 Department of Defense (DoD) PSYOP's master plan and has been accelerated
by the challenges posed by insurgencies in the present conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Lybia, and Syria (Paddock 1999).
Such challenges emphasize the problems of cultural intelligence and how these
generate psychosocial obstacles to achieving tactical ends. Tactical deficits may be