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performance of a standard auction. Even though much work remains to be done in
this area, it is obvious that the communication burden of the quote used should be
evaluated when choosing an auction mechanism over the other.
Further work will refine our comparisons and evaluate additional quoting policies.
For example, it would be interesting to measure the potential benefit of providing full
schedule quotes in standard auctions, as we have for AON auctions. It would be particu-
larly beneficial to identify intermediate quoting policies for AON auctions that provide
much of the benefit of full schedule quotes without the full expense. Understanding this
tradeoff remains an important goal. Finally, we are interested in exploring the strategic
bidding issues posed by indivisibility constraints as well as alternative quoting policies.
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