Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
private values, each bidder receives its signals for an auction just before the auction
begins. In other words, during an auction, the information that bidders obtain about the
others' value signals does not carry forward to subsequent auctions. Hence, as in the
case of [3], our model too shows a decline in the revenue.
6
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has analyzed a model for sequential auctions for objects with private and
common values in an uncertain information setting. We first determined equilibrium
strategies for each auction in a sequence. Then we showed that even if the value and cost
signals are distributed identically across objects, then in accordance with Ashenfelter's
result [1], the expected revenue can decline in later auctions.
There are many interesting directions for future work. First, our present focus was on
determining how the expected revenue varies in a series of English auctions. However,
in order to generalize our results, we intend to extend the analysis to other auction
forms. Second, we studied the case where bidders received the cost and value signals
for an object just before the auction. In future, we will extend the analysis to the case
where the values and costs for the last ( m
1) objects can be determined from the
signals for the first object (i.e., values and costs are perfectly correlated).
References
1. O. Ashenfelter.
How auctions work for wine and art.
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
3(221):23-36, 1989.
2. J. P. Benoit and V. Krishna. Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders. Review
of Economic Studies , 68:155-179, 2001.
3. D. Bernhardt and D. Scoones.
A note on sequential auctions.
The American Economic
Review , 84(3):653-657, 1994.
4. P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 115:341-
388, 2000.
5. H. David. Order Statistics . Wiley, New York, 1969.
6. M. Dwass. Probability and Statistics . W. A. Benjamin Inc., California, 1970.
7. W. Elmaghraby. The importance of ordering in sequential auctions. Management Science ,
49(5):673-682, 2003.
8. S. S. Fatima, M. Wooldridge, and N. R. Jennings. Sequential auctions for objects with
common and private values. In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems , pages 635-642, Utrecht, Netherlands, 2005.
9. J. K. Goeree and T. Offerman. Competitive bidding in auctions with private and common
values. The Economic Journal , 113(489):598-613, 2003.
10. B. Katzman. A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands. Journal of Economic
Theory , 86:77-99, 1999.
11. V. Krishna. Auction Theory . Academic Press, 2002.
12. J. Laffont.
Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data.
European
Economic Review , 41:1-35, 1997.
13. R. P. McAfee and D. Vincent. The declining price anomaly. Journal of Economic Theory ,
60:191-212, 1993.
Search WWH ::




Custom Search