Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
4. C. Boutilier, M. Goldszmidt, and B. Sabata. Continuous value function approx-
imation for sequential bidding policies. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-99) , pages 81-90, 1999.
5. C. Boutilier, M. Goldszmidt, and B. Sabata. Sequential auctions for the allocation
of resources with complementarities. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99) , pages 527-534, 1999.
6. A. Byde, C. Preist, and N. R. Jennings. Decision procedures for multiple auctions.
In Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems , pages 613-622, part 2. ACM press,
2002.
7. G. Cai and P. R. Wurman. Monte Carlo approximation in incomplete-information,
sequential-auction games. Decision Support Systems , 39(2):153-168, 2005.
8. A. Greenwald and J. Boyan. Bidding under uncertainty: Theory and experiments.
In Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelli-
gence , pages 209 - 216, 2004.
9. J.I Van Hemert and J.A. La Poutre. Dynamic routing problems with fruitful
regions: Models and evolutionary computation. In in proceedings of the eigth con-
ference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature (PPSN VIII) , Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages pages 690-699. Springer, 2004.
10. P. Klemperer. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of Economic
Surveys , 13(3):227-286, July 1999.
11. V. Krishna and R. W. Rosenthal. Simultaneous auctions with synergies. Games
and Economic Behavior , 17(1):1-31, 1996.
12. J. MacKie-Mason, A. Osepayshvili, D. Reeves, and M. Wellman. Price prediction
strategies for market-based scheduling. In Proceedings of the 14Th International
Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling, (ICAPS'04) , pages 244-252.
AAAI press, 2004.
13. F. Redondo. Game Theory and Economics. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
14. T. Sandholm. IJCAI computers and thought award 2003, award talk writeup:
Making markets and democracy work: A story of incentives and computing. In in
Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-
03) , pages 1649-1671, 2003.
15. P. Stone, R. E. Schapire, M. L. Littman, J. A. Csirik, and D. McAllester. Decision-
theoretic bidding based on learned density models in simultaneous, interacting
auctions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research , 19:209-242, 2003.
16. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal
of Finance , 16:8-37, 1961.
17. X. Yao and P. J. Darwen. An experimental study of n-person iterated prisoner's
dilemma games. In Evo Workshops , pages 90-108, 1994.
Search WWH ::




Custom Search