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Profits auctioneer, capacity agents 50
23
9,9,9 S
9,9,9
22
21
R=0.25
T=0.5
20
R=0.25
S=0
19
S= 0
P=0.25-
T=0.5
P=0.25 -
18
17
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
number strategic bidding agents
Fig. 3.
Stochastics (a) and Payoffs PD (b)
Based on Figures 2a and 2b, it is of increasing importance for an agent to bid
aggressively in situations where the supply of loads for transport are increasingly
scarce. In such settings, a myopic bidder is vulnerable to exploitation by strategic
bidders. We also expect that uncertainty in the environment will intensify the
need of profit seeking agents to use an aggressive bidding strategy.
5
A Prisoners' Dilemma
Section 4 presented results where agents, though learning, are able to exploit
myopic bidders that do not consider the complementary value of future auctions.
However, if all agents bid strategically, results show learning is detrimental from
the viewpoint of the bidders, but positive from the viewpoint of the auctioneers.
In this section, we argue that the model of Section 2 contains settings that lead to
prisoners' dilemma (PD) [3] type outcomes. The decreasing returns for strategic
bidders in Section 4 are natural in these settings.
In the classic PD, each player has a choice of two operations: either cooperate
(C) with the other player or defect (D). If both players cooperate, they both
receive a given payoff. However, a higher payoff is received by the one player that
defects while the other player receives as “sucker” payoff for cooperating. This
leads both players to pursue the defect strategy and to arrive at the suboptimal
outcome of both players receiving a low reward.
In Figure 3b, we have given the average payoff for 2 players either playing
as myopic bidders (cooperating), or using an overbidding strategy as defined in
Section 3 with a
bidmodifier
of value 0
<<
0
.
5. We consider the case when
there are 2 loads for auction from the same, and only, fruitful region. For a joint
action of (C,C), both players 50% of the time win the first load for auction and
then win the second load for a marginal profit of 0
.
5. By overbidding, one of
the players for situation (C,D) or (D,C), can win both loads by overbidding and
thereby clinching the win for the second load. If both players however defect,
