Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
[FNR
+
02]
J. Feigenbaum, N. Nisan, V. Ramachandran, R. Sami, and S. Shenker. Agents'
privacy in distributed algorithmic mechanisms. Position Paper, 2002.
[FS02]
J. Feigenbaum and S. Shenker. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: Re-
cent results and future directions. In
Proc. of 6th International Workshop on
Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications
,
pages 1-13. ACM Press, 2002.
[GMW87]
O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game or a
completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In
Proc. of 19th STOC
,
pages 218-229. ACM Press, 1987.
[Gol01]
O. Goldreich.
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1, Basic Tools
. Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
[HT04]
J. Halpern and V. Teague. Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In
Proc. of 36th STOC
. ACM Press, 2004.
[Kik01]
H. Kikuchi. (M+1)st-price auction protocol. In
Proc. of 5th Conference on Fi-
nancial Cryptography
, volume 2339 of
LNCS
, pages 351-363. Springer, 2001.
[Kus89]
E. Kushilevitz. Privacy and communication complexity. In
Proc. of 30th FOCS
Symposium
, pages 416-421. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1989.
[LSP82]
L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine generals problem.
ACM
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems
, 4(3):382-401, 1982.
[MPS03]
R. McGrew, R. Porter, and Y. Shoham. Towards a general theory of non-
cooperative computation. In
Proc. of 9th International Conference on Theoretical
Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK)
, 2003.
[MT99]
D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. Distributed games: From mechanisms to pro-
tocols. In
Proc. of 15th AAAI Conference
, pages 32-37. AAAI Press, 1999.
[MV04]
A. Mehta and V. Vazirani. Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are
randomizations over truthful auctions. In
Proc. of 5th ACM Conference on E-
Commerce
, pages 120-124. ACM Press, 2004.
[Nao89]
M. Naor. Bit commitment using pseudorandomness. In
Proc. of 9th CRYPTO
Conference
, volume 435 of
LNCS
, pages 128-137. Springer, 1989.
[NPS99]
M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism
design. In
Proc. of 1st ACM Conference on E-Commerce
, pages 129-139. ACM
Press, 1999.
[PS03]
R. Porter and Y. Shoham. On cheating in sealed-bid auctions. In
Proc. of 4th
ACM Conference on E-Commerce
, pages 76-84. ACM Press, 2003.
[RTK90]
M. H. Rothkopf, T. J. Teisberg, and E. P. Kahn. Why are Vickrey auctions rare?
Journal of Political Economy
, 98(1):94-109, 1990.
[San93]
T. Sandholm. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal
cost calculations. In
Proc. of 10th AAAI Conference
, pages 256-262. AAAI Press,
1993.
[Yao82]
A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computation. In
Proc. of 23th FOCS Symposium
,
pages 160-164. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1982.