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day 0. It then purchased additional components at very high prices during the rest of
the game. It was able to compensate to some extent for these high prices through more
evenly spaced deliveries of components and lower resulting storage costs. The major
strength of this agent compared to the others was an ability to consistently sell high
volumes of PCs throughout game at high prices by targeting profitable markets.
Acknowledgments
We thank SICS and the rest of the TAC/SCM organizers and participants for another
interesting opportunity to analyze trading agent strategy. This work was supported in
part by NSF grant IIS-0205435 and the DARPA REAL strategic reasoning program.
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