Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
It would remain for various British proponents of evolutionism to first take
this final step.
To the extent that the embodiment of history within scientific concepts
was also being carried over into more general patterns of political thought
in post-revolutionary Europe—that is to say, becoming a marked attribute of
the modern consciousness more broadly—this pattern also had important
implications for the public fortunes of science. If we assume that public
identities abide within historical narratives, then the rendering of history as
scientific theory also meant that the public ethos was now linked to science.
In such a world, the scientific
nomos
overlaps with the public
nomos
, and
the naturalized
cosmos
in which this public identity is grounded becomes
an important resource of scientific authority. World-building of this kind,
of course, had been the explicit aim of the classical positivists, and this was
also the basis of their grandiose priestly aspirations. Having openly declared
that their social theories now assumed the authority formerly given to the-
ology in the interpretation of historical meaning, Comte and Saint-Simon
also aspired to command proportionate political power as the high priests
of this emerging secular culture.
In the closing pages of the last chapter, I argued that this new micro-
cosm/macrocosm identity had the potential to provide a symbolic structure
capable of supporting scientific patronage and that its features are key to
understanding the offspring ideology of evolutionism. As we return now
across the English Channel to consider the revised positivism of Thomas
Henry Huxley, these patronage concerns become crucial—most specifically
in accounting for the ways in which evolutionism differentiated itself from
classical positivism. While Huxley shared the positivist ambition to remake
European civilization in the image of science, his formulations of this idea
were constrained by his all-consuming drive to professionalize English sci-
ence. In this role, Huxley could not vouchsafe a form of positivism that
threatened to elevate the social sciences above the natural sciences. To con-
cede the scientific priesthood to Comte's English disciples would have been
tantamount to surrendering the terms upon which scientific patronage
would henceforth be negotiated.
This practical danger explains why Huxley would continuously rebuff
the efforts of Comte's English disciples to align him with their cause. His
obstinate unwillingness to acknowledge his own ideological kinship with
the English positivists reflects his understanding of the practical rhetori-
cal conditions under which this new professional identity needed to take
form. More importantly, this conflict illuminates the ideological needs that
