Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
background knowledge, hypotheses) and the world of sense data (experimental
observations). Laws (theories, hypotheses) are induced from empirical findings
(Carnap, 1966). Consequences deduced by combining hypotheses with estab-
lished underlying principles (such as fundamental laws of chemistry and physics)
are examined experimentally to test the new hypotheses (see also Fig. 3). Given
sufficient positive testing, they are transformed to underlying principles through
theorization. For testing, theories should be quantitative (Carnap, 1966). It is
seen as a great asset when laws and theories can also be
reduced
to underlying
theories of greater validity and generality. Here thermodynamics has always
served as an example; its first and second laws were first determined empiri-
cally (Nagel, 1961). The former was then elevated to a general scientific law
that is also valid at the more microscopic level. The latter was deduced from
the underlying principle of large numbers of substates and evolution towards
increased probability with time. Quantum mechanics has also served as such an
example: Schrödinger's equation and wave functions were 'induced' so as to be
able to explain observations, such as the periodicity in the Table of Chemical
Elements. Modern elementary particle physics appears to continue along these
lines, ever inducing new phenomena and properties such as quarks, charms and
colours. More generally, physics aims to explain multiple phenomena on the
basis of simpler and fewer principles. Indeed, the first law of thermodynamics
is much simpler than the 100% efficient conversion between all sorts of energy
that it prescribes. In the classical philosophy of science, explanation by simple
underlying principles is important (cf. Nagel, 1961, p. 321).
Of course, this philosophy of science is incomplete. It is very often too
simplistic to state that science deduces predictions from hypotheses that can be
verified. Indeed, it is seen in most quarters as much more important to try to
make predictions that can then be used to falsify hypotheses (Popper, 1992).
Then in practice, the sociology of science also comes in, where hypotheses
are not actually falsified by their originators, but rather by competing, younger
researchers, albeit only after the proponents of the original hypothesis have
become less active or passed on (cf. Kuhn, 1996; Lakatos, 1978; Primas, 1981).
However, this is not the issue we would like to discuss here, as we shall focus
on the extent to which classical, molecular and systems biology do conform to
what used to be defined as science by the main philosophers of science, or more
specifically physics (Carnap, 1966).
1.2. Biology
While theoretical physics is both respectable and a major part of the activities of
physicists, theoretical biology is a minor part of modern biology and is treated
largely with disdain by most experimentalists (Kell, 2006). Not all of classical
biology conformed strictly to the scientific methods recalled above, as it was
