Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
whether intertheoretic reduction can be a criterion for the progress of biological
sciences lasted for several decades of the last century. It led to the consensus that
the existing paradigms for intertheoretic reduction are inadequate, especially for
biology.
The nested whole-part relationship of living systems immediately suggests a
reductionist research strategy and this refers back to the first type of reductionism
mentioned above: break the whole apart and study the parts in isolation. Radical
reductionists are convinced that a complete knowledge of the parts will give the
behaviour of the whole without further ado. This view on reality can be illustrated
with some hard-boiled reductionist adages, such as 'an organism is essentially
nothing but a collection of atoms and molecules' (Crick, 1966), 'there is only
one science, physics, all the rest is social work' (Watson in conversation with
Rose, 1994), and 'all science is either physics or stamp collecting' (attributed to
Rutherford).
In the alternative antireductionistic or holistic approach, complex wholes are
considered not to be understandable from the mere knowledge of the behaviour
of the parts in isolation. A holist rather takes the opposite stance; only properties
of the system as a whole may offer understanding. In many cases, the antireduc-
tionist argues that the context of the whole entirely determines the behaviour of
the parts and that the behaviour of the parts within the system is qualitatively
different from their behaviour in isolation. A crucial aspect of the context of the
organism is that the parts almost invariably engage in nonlinear interactions. In
nonlinear interactions, qualitatively new properties can arise, depending on the
state the system is in, as the strength of the interactions vary with that state.
Consequently, the emergence of new properties from the interaction of two com-
ponents, depends on the activity of other components of the system, possibly
many other components if not the entire genome. These new properties and the
conditionality of when they arise compromise the statement that the properties of
all parts in isolation may provide a sufficient base for prediction of the properties
of the whole. Such a base is only provided if the properties of the parts include
their interactive properties and the state of the system is given (Bruggeman et al.,
2002; Boogerd et al., 2005). Here it is important that the state a living system is
in is not an equilibrium state, but is maintained by the continued activity of a
number of dissipative processes. The state is a manifestation of the functioning
whole. Synthesis is not simply the reverse of analysis, and the whole should be
taken into account, if only because it sets the condition of the system including
the type, number and relative position of its components.
Antireductionists emphasize that the whole should be taken into account,
but usually fail to explicate precisely how (this point has been made formally
by Rosen (1991) in
Life Itself
). The above implies that all levels of organiza-
tion have their value. It also suggests that there is use for autonomous theo-
ries at each level. At its extreme, radical antireductionism asserts a priori that
