Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
the philosophical foundations of physics, one should then be able to verify
or falsify that description. As we now know with our molecular and systems
biology understanding, one should expect this 'dependence' to be positive if
a catabolic enzyme is stimulated, but negative if the ribosomes are stimulated
to increase growth rate. However, knowing which of the two was activating
was not an option for the holist physiological approach. Consequently, models
would be falsified and nonmolecular biology obtained a bit of a reputation of an
unpredictable science if a science at all.
By contrast, after complete dissection (reduction), one could define the system
in terms of physical entities that one could then modulate in only one way (e.g. the
concentration of an mRNA),
in vitro
. Then a reproducible scientific strategy was
possible, thanks to this reductionist strategy. Who would question the reductionist
mood of a winning team of molecular biologists? With this topic, this is exactly
what we intend to do. To be sure, we fully agree that the reductionist approach
worked extremely well for some five decades, but to maintain the winning mood
in the twenty-first century, it is not clear that this approach will suffice. At the turn
of the twentieth century, an ever-growing number of biological scientists mention
limits to reductionism (e.g. Bock & Goode, 1998; Gallagher & Appenzeller,
1999; Kiberstis & Roberts, 2002; Chong & Ray, 2002). The molecular biological
revolution led to a characterization of the molecular constitution of organisms.
Systems biology aims to decipher how the molecules jointly bring about cellular
behaviour. The fact that the molecules are supposed to do this jointly suggests
that studying them only individually without a focus on their interactions may
not work. On the other hand, it is clear that a return to the holist physiology
strategy will not work either. Perhaps some new strategy is needed, with unique
philosophical foundations.
3.2. Philosophers focus on philosophy of evolutionary biology
Up to the 1960s' the philosophy of science hardly explored the nature of sci-
ences other than physics (Machamer, 2002). Philosophy of biology came of
age only in the latest three decades (Callebaut, 2005). To date, philosophers
of biology have mainly engaged in discussions about (i) the autonomy of biol-
ogy (ii) evolutionary biology and (iii) molecular (functional) biology. As Mayr
(1996) noted, the position of biology among the sciences has been the most
prominent and controversial issue of the philosophy of biology; some consider
biology an extension of chemistry and physics, others claim the autonomy of
biology. The position of biology among the sciences as an autonomous science
is by and large safeguarded by the peculiar characteristics of the living world,
as encountered in functional biology, but particularly in evolutionary biology
(Mayr, 1961; Mayr, 1996). The potential reduction of classical (Mendelian)
genetics to molecular genetics has been the subject of philosophical discussions
