Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
1.
INTRODUCTION: MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION AND
REDUCTION
Recent philosophical discussions often tend to emphasize mechanistic explana-
tion as an alternative to reductive explanation, especially insofar as reduction
is construed in terms of theory reduction (cf. Richardson, 2002; Richardson &
Stephan, 2007). The latter claims to render higher level explanations either
redundant or eliminable, depending on whether, on the one hand, the higher level
explanations are retained as at least approximate (as is the case when we com-
pare Newtonian and Relativistic mechanics), or, on the other hand, the higher
level explanations are falsified and replaced (as is the case with Aristotelian
and Galilean physics). Mechanistic explanation offers a different perspective
on the understanding of the relationship of explanations at different levels or,
perhaps better, the relationship of explanations incorporating different levels
of organization.
2
In mechanistic models, higher level explanations are neither
redundant nor eliminable. There is genuine explanatory work done at the higher
level, reflecting systemic properties. When this is so, and when that explanatory
work is not captured at a lower level, the higher levels of explanation are not
eliminable. As Kitano says,
A system level understanding of a biological system includes the network of
gene interactions and biochemical pathways as well as the mechanisms by which
such interactions modulate the physical properties of intracellular and multicellular
structures.
(2002, p. 1662)
The recent reinvigoration of mechanism within philosophy derives from the
idea that the Positivistic approaches to reduction and explanation fail, for one
reason or another, to capture scientific practice, especially in the biological
sciences (e.g., see Wimsatt, 1976; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; and Cartwright,
1995). The recent reinvigoration of systems ideas within biology derives from
the parallel idea that reductionist ideals are inadequate for understanding some
of the most fundamental biological phenomena. We want to join accounts of
mechanistic explanation with those of systems biology. Within more Positivistic
accounts of reduction, and theoretical integration, the point is the elimination of
higher order theories or models. As we understand mechanistic modeling, this is
2
The appeal to mechanistic explanation has a deep history, dating at least to the seventeenth century. Some-
times, mechanistic explanation means little more than causal explanation, and sometimes simply explanation
in terms of the laws of mechanics. Among Logical Positivists, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the
thought was that formal, or structuralist, accounts of explanation would capture mechanistic and reductionistic
models; these were, explicitly, an attempt to capture the idea of causal/mechanistic explanation in a formal
mode. We will focus on mechanistic explanation only conceived as an alternative to theory reduction.
