Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
Priortothattime,growersandscientistsassumedthatMokotransmission
tookplaceprimarilyviaplantroots.However,companystudiesfoundthat
under plantation conditions Moko almost always infected banana plants
via the machetes and knives used by weeding and pruning crews. The
companyrespondedbydevisingacontrolprogrambasedontooldisinfec-
tion, the prompt removal of infected plants, and re-planting with steril-
ized rhizomes.
Cases of Moko remained few and scattered in Honduras until 1961
when an outbreak occurred that could not be linked to tool infection.
43
United Fruit scientists discovered that a range of flying insects, including
bees (Trigona species) wasps (Polybia species) and fruit flies (Drosophilia
species) were transmitting a particularly virulent strain of the bacteria.
In just two years, bees and other flying disease vectors transported the
pathogen up to 150 kilometers.
44
Once established in the plantation envi-
ronment, Moko spread via the roots of the densely set Cavendish plants
and the tools of unwary workers. Outside of the plantations, the bacte-
ria infected the same plantain variety (known as ''Chato'' in Honduras)
that had been devastated inTrinidad. Concerned that the pathogen would
persist in scattered patches of plantains, United Fruit worked to eliminate
Chatos in the vicinity of its plantations.
45
Achieving this goal required a
certaindegreeofcooperationfromareafarmerswhohadtobeconvinced
to stop growing the popularcrop. However, the effects of Moko may have
been sucient to convince farmers to give up on thevariety. In 1963, after
visiting one of the places where the ''original build up'' of Moko had oc-
curred, a fruit company scientist predicted that ''people will continue to
destroy Chatos on their own when they see that they will remain unpro-
ductive.''
46
He added that many Sula valley growers had already replaced
their plantains with corn and other crops. In 1965, the company reported
that it was providing the Honduran government and area cultivators with
rhizomes of a resistant ''Chato-like'' plantain for planting.
47
That same year, Standard Fruit reported to the U.S. embassy that
Moko was causing severe problems for thousands of small-scale cultiva-
tors who depended on Chatos to feed both their families and animals.
Some people traveled for two days to Standard Fruit's Aguán valley farms
in order to obtain discarded green bananas as a substitute for plantains.
48
Company o
cials, emphasizing that they had never seen such levels of
hungerintheregion,stronglyurgedtheU.S.governmenttoprovideemer-
gency assistance. In the meantime, a Standard Fruit employee inspected
areas lying on the peripheryof the company's farms for signs of Moko in-
fection.UpondetectingpatchesofdiseasedChato,thecompanyinspector
