Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
biology, plant pathology, and statistics.
13
The Standard Fruit Company
also invested in research during the 1950s, establishing a formal research
program for the first time in the company's history. The banana industry
was placing its future largely in the hands of university trained research
scientists armed with a growing array of chemical weapons with which to
combat the ''enemies'' of the banana.
14
Followingthe1954strike,UnitedFruit'sresearchstaffplayedacentral
roleinrevampingproductionprocessesinordertomakethemmorelabor
e
cient. The most dramatic changes took place in the area of Sigatoka
control. By the mid-1950s, United Fruit was annually spending around
20 million dollars (6-7 percent of its total operating costs) to protect
its Gros Michel plants from Sigatoka.
15
One company o
cial estimated
that workers annually applied enough Bordeaux spray to fill a 2,000-
acre lake to a depth of one foot. With both labor and material costs on
the rise, the fruit companies sought out alternative chemical fungicides.
However, field trials of at least 55 different fungicidal compounds carried
out by United Fruit researchers between 1936 and 1952 failed to yield a
viable alternative to high-volume applications of copper sulfate.
16
In addi-
tion to its high fungicidal activity, Bordeaux spray's ''spreading and stick-
ing'' qualities protected plant tissues for up to four weeks. The spray also
provided protection against various kinds of leaf-eating caterpillars and
locusts. Finally, the same blue residue that caused such consternation
for workers aided supervisors responsible for monitoring spray opera-
tions. The situation began to change in 1955, when French researchers in
Guadeloupe made the surprising discovery that low-volume applications
of orchard oils effectively held Sigatoka in check.
17
Twoyears later, United
Fruit scientists reported that small-scale testing indicated that various oil
compounds provided better Sigatoka control than Bordeaux spray. How-
ever, they refrained from endorsing a switch to oil-based sprays prior to
the completion of a more thorough study.
18
In November 1957, SITRATERCO decried the company's efforts to
eliminate the Bordeaux spray system: ''This time the company is trying to
eliminate an enormous amount of its workers (nearly 33 percent) in one
fell swoop.''
19
The union reminded its members of past failures with aerial
applications of fungicides and pointed out the potential health prob-
lems associated with inhaling fungicidal dust. A return to aerial spraying,
SITRATERCO's leaders warned, would exposeworkers to toxic chemicals
andcondemnthemtothelistof ''whiteplague''victims.
20
Inapressrelease
issued one month later, SITRATERCO ocials reiterated their concerns
about the risks that aerial fungicide applications posed to human health:
