Sigatoka, Science, and Control - Banana Cultures - page 96

veteran employees were reluctant to sever long-established relationships.
In addition, World War II shipping restrictions led to serious economic
losses for non-company growers. 53 Coming at a time when the U.S. gov-
ernment was promoting its ''Good Neighbor Policy'' in Latin America,
fruit company o cials perhaps sensed a need to avoid adopting policies
that would generate controversy. But Der Coerr's report confirms that,
political concerns aside, poquitero production was declining in impor-
tancebecauseexportbananaproductionrequiredcostlyinputsinorderto
adapt to dynamic agroecosystems and evolving quality standards. These
inputs included knowledge generated by a cadre of professional scientists
whowouldplayanincreasinglyimportantroleindefiningandcontrolling
plant pathogens.
the science of sigatoka control
Although Sigatoka was under control by 1940, United Fruit scientists
in Honduras found ''no indications'' that the pathogen could be eradi-
cated. 54 Consequently, they turned their attention to increasing the eco-
nomic eciency of fungicide applications. Their efforts initially showed
signs of success: between 1937 and 1939, the cost of spray operations
dropped from sixty-three dollars per acre to around forty dollars per
acre. This sharp decline in costs resulted from a reduction in the fre-
quencyof application. 55 But the downward trend in Sigatoka control costs
was short-lived partly because of the variability of climatic conditions.
Throughout the 1940s, seasonal increases in disease activity linked to
above-average rainfall and cool temperatures prompted the company to
shorten spray cycles. Between 1941 and 1951, the average cost of spray-
ing increased from $2.51 to $3.58 per acre. 56 By the early 1950s, United
Fruitfarmsannuallyreceivedabout15-17Bordeauxtreatments.Thehigh-
volume spraying consumed 265 gallons/acre of fungicide solution per
application.
United Fruit's near-exclusive focus on chemical controls for Sigatoka
contrasted with Caribbean-based research programs. Although growers
in parts of Jamaica used Bordeaux sprays, Dunlap's system was not well
suited for Caribbean banana zones where predominantly small-scale cul-
tivators often farmed hilly terrain with limited access to irrigation. In
addition, non-company farmers in the Caribbean faced a similar set of
financial and labor constraints as their Central American counterparts.
The distinct agroecological conditions found in the Caribbean compelled
researcherstostudylesscapital-andlabor-intensivecontrolmeasures,in-