Natural Selection and Causal Productivity - Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics - page 156

biases about what entities count as individuals, and these biases can lead us to
mistaken conclusions about causality. If populations can be causally productive,
perhaps other, similar entities can as well: communities, ecosystems, etc.
Organisms are not a privileged level of organization.
Acknowledgements Thanks to Carl Craver, Lindley Darden, and Stuart Glennan for much
relevant and productive discussion about causation and mechanisms. Thanks also to the
Griesemer/Millstein Lab, my Winter 2011 Philosophy of Science seminar, and attendees of the
Taiwan Conference on the Philosophy of Biology and Economics for helpful comments and
questions, and to Joyce Havstad and Michael Strevens for helpful comments on my draft. Finally,
thanks to Carl Craver for an excellent set of referee comments.
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