Biology Reference
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Chapter 7
Mechanisms and Laws: Clarifying the Debate
Carl F. Craver and Marie I. Kaiser
Abstract Leuridan ( 2010 ) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws
at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing
discussion about the relationship between the mechanistic structures evident in the
theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in
traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see, e.g., Wimsatt
1974 ; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 ; Bogen, Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed
Sci, 36:397-420, 2005; Darden 2006 ; Glennan, Erkenntnis, 44:49-71, 1996;
MDC, Philos Sci, 67:1-25, 2000; Schaffner 1993 ; Tabery 2004 ; Weber 2005 ).
In our view, Leuridan misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that
mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stron-
ger claim that all causal claims require laws is unsupported by his arguments.
Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan's arguments, our greater purpose is
to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms
enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and
provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation,
and control.
C.F. Craver ( * )
Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive,
St. Louis, MO 63130, USA
e-mail: ccraver@artsci.wustl.edu
M.I. Kaiser
DFG-Research Group “Causation and Explanation”, University of Cologne,
Richard-Strauss-Str. 2, D-50931 Cologne, Germany
e-mail: Kaiser.m@uni-koeln.de
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