Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Chapter 6
Experimental Discovery, Data Models,
and Mechanisms in Biology: An Example
from Mendel's Work
Ruey-Lin Chen
Abstract The aim of this chapter is to argue that there are experimental discoveries
that could have been made
independent of
theories. I will explore the questions of
whether there are experimental discoveries and, if so, what counts as an experi-
mental discovery and what the relation is between experimental discovery and the
discovery of a mechanism. Gregor Mendel's work on peas will be taken as the main
example. Frederick Griffith's experiment with
Pneumococcus
bacteria in mice and
Hans Driesch's experiment on sea urchin embryos will be discussed as foils.
I conclude that an experimental discovery can be identified and recognized by the
following conditions: (1) An experimenter must propose
data models
to reveal
significant phenomena, (2)
no
established theories can predict and explain the
phenomena, and (3) the experimenter must envisage searching for
underlying
mechanisms
for the phenomena, whether or not he or she proposes correct mecha-
nistic explanations. I also argue that experimental discovery usually precedes and is
a prerequisite for the discovery of mechanism. It plays a role in three ways:
organizing
data into significant phenomena,
producing
the need and motivation
to discover mechanisms, and
constraining
the direction for construction of theoret-
ical hypotheses.
1
Introduction
In the philosophy of science, the problem, research foci, and terms related to
scientific discovery have evolved over time. In the beginning, philosophers of
science had to resist the dominant idea in the field—that of the distinction between
discovery and justification—and argue for the philosophical significance of
R.-L. Chen (
*
)
Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University,
168, University Rd, Min-Hsiung, Chia-Yi, Taiwan
e-mail:
pyrlc@ccu.edu.tw
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